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PULLING THE TRIGGER ON PUBLIC CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE:  THE CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO 
ANALYZING TRIGGER FUNDS 
George LoBiondo*  
 
The unpredictable nature of electoral politics makes it difficult for public 
campaign financing programs to be both efficient and effective.  Programs 
that award too much money to publicly funded candidates risk insolvency, 
while miserly systems cannot attract participants.  Moreover, the 
competitiveness of any given race changes with each election cycle—what 
was a landslide one year might be the closest of contests next November. 
Several states have tried to address this dilemma by enacting “trigger” 
provisions that disburse extra money to publicly funded candidates only 
after their opponents raise or spend beyond a certain amount.  These laws 
have faced legal challenges from political committees and candidates who 
argue that trigger funds provisions flout the First Amendment’s protection 
of political speech by aiding the speaker’s opponent.  Supporters of 
campaign finance regulation counter that trigger funds facilitate political 
speech rather than chilling it. 
This Note examines the widely divergent federal court rulings on these 
challenges, both before and after the U.S. Supreme Court’s important Davis 
v. FEC opinion, with a focus on the U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit’s recent McComish v. Bennett decision.  It finds that none of the 
trigger funds jurisprudence has fully analyzed both the state interest in the 
provisions and in trigger funds’ burdensome effects.  The Note then 
recommends a contextual approach to understanding the state interest in 
public finance legislation.  It asserts that courts should not scrutinize a 
state’s trigger provision in isolation from the rest of its public finance 
regime.  The Note concludes that because typical trigger funds provisions 
encourage participation in public financing, which in turn reduces 
corruption, trigger funds survive First Amendment scrutiny. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After a series of political corruption scandals, the State of Arizona passed 
the Citizens Clean Election Act (Act) through a ballot initiative in 1998.1  
Arizona’s public financing program includes a matching funds (or “trigger 
funds”) provision,2 through which a participating candidate can receive 
additional funds from the government if her nonparticipating opponent’s 
expenditures exceed a certain threshold.3  Several conservative 
organizations and candidates for Arizona political office have sought to 
have the law declared unconstitutional on First Amendment and Equal 
Protection grounds.4  The case has made its way up the federal court 
system, and will soon appear before the U.S. Supreme Court.5 
At the core of the trigger funds dispute are conflicting claims about the 
First Amendment.  Does it exist to maximize the aggregate amount of 
speech?  Or, rather, should it first protect speakers against state-imposed 
burdens on speech?  The seminal Supreme Court case on public campaign 
finance, Buckley v. Valeo,6 offers conflicting advice.  The per curiam 
decision upheld much of the amended Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971, and generally approved of public finance as promoting First 
Amendment values.7  Buckley confirmed that the First Amendment aimed 
to protect the “‘widest possible dissemination of information from diverse 
and antagonistic sources.’”8  However, the Court cautioned that “the First 
Amendment simply cannot tolerate [a] restriction upon the freedom of a 
 
 1. See McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 
644 (2010); Robert Barnes, High Court to Weigh Arizona Campaign Finance Law, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 30, 2010, at A2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/11/29/AR2010112906019.html. 
 2. Because the term “matching funds” can refer to several very different public finance 
mechanisms, this particular type will be referred to throughout this Note as “trigger funds.” 
 3. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-952 (2006). 
 4. McComish, 611 F.3d at 513.  Although the McComish complaint alleged both First 
Amendment and Equal Protection violations, both the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Arizona and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined to rule on the Equal 
Protection claim. Id. at 513–14; McComish v. Brewer, No. CV-08-1550, 2010 WL 2292213, 
at *10 (D. Ariz. Jan. 20, 2010), rev’d sub nom. McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 5. See McComish v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 644 (2010); Lyle Denniston, Feb., March 
Arguments Day by Day, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 23, 2010, 1:02 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/12/feb-march-arguments-day-by-day/. 
 6. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 7. Id. at 57 n.65, 92–93; see also McComish, 611 F.3d at 526 (“Buckley held that public 
financing of elections furthers First Amendment values . . . .”). 
 8. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 
(1963)). 
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candidate to speak without legislative limit on behalf of his own 
candidacy.”9 
Lower courts have struggled with how to reconcile trigger funds 
provisions with Buckley’s dual edicts.  Since protected speech triggers a 
public candidate’s funds, courts have split as to whether this trigger burdens 
that protected speech, and if so, whether the burden can be justified.  This 
Note explores the different conclusions that federal courts have reached, 
and answers the question of whether trigger funds can survive in light of the 
Roberts Court’s recent campaign finance jurisprudence. 
In Part I, this Note explains the background of public finance legislation, 
surveys the circuit split regarding trigger funds that existed prior to 2008, 
and shows how the Supreme Court’s Davis v. FEC10 decision of that year 
fundamentally changed the framework for analyzing the constitutionality of 
trigger funds.  In Part II, this Note explores how courts have undertaken this 
new analysis, with a focus on the McComish opinions by the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Arizona and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit.  Finally, Part III argues that courts have failed to distinguish 
Davis’s analysis of the state’s interest.  It offers an approach by which 
courts can effectively analyze indivisible provisions of comprehensive 
public finance regimes.  This Note concludes that Arizona’s legislation 
would survive the scrutiny of such an approach; accordingly, the Supreme 
Court should uphold the Act. 
I.  TRIGGER FUNDS:  A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Part I begins by briefly discussing the history of public finance 
legislation.  Next, it introduces the concept of trigger funds provisions in 
public finance regimes.  It then analyzes Buckley and the legal framework 
federal courts use to evaluate campaign finance statutes and surveys the 
major circuit split on trigger funds that preceded the Supreme Court’s Davis 
decision.  Part I concludes by evaluating the Davis opinion and its effect on 
trigger funds analysis. 
A.  Campaign Finance, Public Finance, and Trigger Funds 
This section briefly traces the origins of campaign finance reform at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, and then recounts the passage of the 
first national public finance regime, the Federal Election Campaign Act.  It 
then discusses the problems facing public finance schemes and the solutions 
that trigger provisions offer.  It concludes with a brief explanation of the 
criticisms of trigger funds. 
 
 9. Id. at 54. 
 10. 554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
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1.  Campaign Finance and the Future of Public Financing 
Campaign finance reform is often traced back to President Theodore 
Roosevelt.11  After a quid pro quo scandal, wherein Roosevelt was accused 
of selling an ambassadorship for campaign contributions,12 the President 
petitioned Congress for limits on campaign contributions and for a public 
financing scheme.13  Roosevelt’s suggestions resulted in the Tillman Act of 
1907, which limited some corporate contributions but stopped short of 
creating a framework for public finance.14 
Campaign finance reform did not become salient again until the 1970s.15  
In 1974, following Watergate and the specter of a corrupt presidential 
election, Congress amended its 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act 
(FECA) to incorporate several major reforms.16  Chief among these were 
the establishment of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and 
amendments to the Internal Revenue Code allowing citizens to divert their 
tax dollars to finance presidential elections.17  In exchange for receiving 
“public” money from this fund, presidential candidates agree to a limit on 
private fundraising.18  Many states have adopted variations of this public 
funding regime.19 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo, which struck down 
many of FECA’s regulations on private campaign spending, made public 
financing all the more important.20  Candidates cannot be required to limit 
campaign expenditures, but they can be induced to do so voluntarily with 
the promise of public funds.21  In many cases, a candidate who is unwilling 
 
 11. See, e.g., L. SANDY MAISEL, PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN AMERICA:  THE ELECTORAL 
PROCESS 236 (1987); Kate Pickert, Campaign Financing:  A Brief History, TIME (June 30, 
2008), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1819288,00.html. 
 12. Pickert, supra note 11; see also HENRY F. PRINGLE, THEODORE ROOSEVELT:  A 
BIOGRAPHY 451–52 (1931). 
 13. See LARRY J. SABATO & HOWARD R. ERNST, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN POLITICAL 
PARTIES AND ELECTIONS 275 (updated ed. 2007); Pickert, supra note 11. 
 14. THOM HARTMANN, UNEQUAL PROTECTION:  HOW CORPORATIONS BECAME 
“PEOPLE”—AND HOW YOU CAN FIGHT BACK 124 (2d ed. 2010); Anthony Corrado, Money 
and Politics:  A History of Federal Campaign Finance Law, in THE NEW CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 12–13 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 2005). 
 15. See Pickert, supra note 11; see also Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and 
Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1055 
(1996) (noting that federal campaign finance laws passed in the six decades after the Tillman 
Act were “generally toothless and were largely ignored”). 
 16. BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH:  THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 
31–38 (2001); David R. Simon, Watergate and the Nixon Presidency:  A Comparative 
Ideological Analysis, in WATERGATE AND AFTERWARD:  THE LEGACY OF RICHARD M. NIXON 
15 (Leon Friedman & William F. Levantrosser eds., 1992). 
 17. SMITH, supra note 16, at 32; Simon, supra note 16, at 15. 
 18. SMITH, supra note 16, at 32–33. 
 19. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY:  LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE 
POLITICAL PROCESS 444 (3d ed. 2007). 
 20. See id. at 443.  For an analysis of Buckley and its impact, see infra Part I.B. 
 21. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 19, at 443 (“Buckley imposes a constitutional 
barrier to Congress simply mandating restrictions on expenditures.  The alternative would be 
to induce candidates to forego expenditures beyond a set level as a condition of receiving 
public funds.”). 
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to engage in vigorous fundraising (or one who is unsuccessful at it) may 
conclude that self-imposing such a limit is a small price to pay for an 
infusion of cash from the State.22 
One lingering problem with public financing, however, is its 
sustainability.23  An inverse relationship exists between the decreasing 
public interest in funding public finance programs and the increasing cost of 
mounting competitive campaigns.  Although polling data is inconclusive 
about public support for public finance,24 the number of Americans 
participating in the tax check-off that funds the presidential public finance 
system has steadily decreased.25  Some states that rely on tax check-off 
funding have seen a similar decrease.26  Other states are facing broader 
budget crises that imperil their public finance programs.27  In the midst of 
these revenue problems, the costs associated with mounting a competitive 
political campaign continue to rise.28 
2.  Trigger Funds Provisions 
Trigger funds provisions offer an interesting solution to this problem.  
Instead of disbursing a lump sum to public candidates, or a multiple of the 
total the candidate has raised from private sources (called “multiplier 
match”),29 trigger funds operate differently.  Under a trigger funds regime, 
 
 22. See, e.g., McCain Presses Obama on Public Financing, MSNBC.COM (Feb. 20, 
2008), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23257223/ (noting that, if Senator John McCain and 
then-Senator Barack Obama each accepted $85 million in public financing, this “would 
clearly give the advantage to McCain, who dislikes fundraising, and would hinder Obama 
and his widespread fundraising apparatus”). 
 23. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 19, at 443. 
 24. See Stephen R. Weissman & Ruth A. Hassan, Public Opinion Polls Concerning 
Public Financing of Federal Elections 1972–2000:  A Critical Analysis and Proposed 
Future Directions, CAMPAIGN FINANCE INST., 2 (2005), www.cfinst.org/
president/pdf/PublicFunding_Surveys.pdf (finding that responses to polls about public 
finance largely depend upon the language and context of the poll question). 
 25. Id.; see also ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 19, at 443. 
 26. See, e.g., Sasha Horwitz, Public Campaign Financing in Michigan:  Driving Toward 
Collapse?, CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, 10–11 (2008), http://www.cgs.org/
images/publications/cgs_mi_final_081808.pdf;  Steven M. Levin, Public Campaign 
Financing in Wisconsin:  Showing Its Age, CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, 20 (2008), 
http://www.cgs.org/images/publications/cgs_wi_final_081808.pdf. 
 27. See, e.g., Jessica A. Levinson, Public Campaign Financing in Florida:  A Program 
Sours, CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, 27 (2008), 
http://www.cgs.org/images/publications/cgs_pcf_fla_final_021909.pdf. 
 28. See, e.g., Leslie Wayne, Campaign ‘08:  Most Expensive Ever, THE CAUCUS:  THE 
POL. AND GOV’T BLOG OF THE TIMES (Oct. 24, 2008, 12:01 PM), 
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/campaign-08-most-expensive-ever/ (calling 
the 2008 campaign cycle the most expensive ever); Election 2010 to Shatter Spending 
Records as Republicans Benefit from Late Cash Surge, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (Oct. 27, 
2010, 4:00 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/10/election-2010-to-shatter-
spending-r.html (noting that the 2010 midterm elections were more expensive than the 
previous record-setting midterms of 2006). 
 29. For example, New York City’s public finance regime matches individual 
contributions at a $6-to-$1 rate. See Why Should I Join?, NEW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN FIN. 
BD., http://www.nyccfb.info/candidates/candidates/whyJoin.aspx?sm=candidates_whyJoin 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2011). 
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public money is disbursed to the participating candidate based on how 
much her opponent has raised or spent.30  Courts have praised the inherent 
efficiency of this structure: 
By linking the amount of public funding in individual races to the amount 
of money being spent in these races, the State is able to allocate its 
funding among races of varying levels of competitiveness without having 
to make qualitative evaluations of which candidates are more “deserving” 
of funding beyond the base amounts provided to all publicly-funded 
candidates.31 
Proponents of trigger funds regimes urge that other public finance 
disbursal devices, such as the lump sum and multiplier match, are less 
effective.32  Unlike those programs, trigger funds allow public finance 
systems to disburse only as much money to their candidates as is necessary 
in the context of a particular political contest.33  They operate as a “time-
sensitive market-correction device,”34 tying the disbursement amount to the 
race at hand, rather than looking at what has been spent in past elections or 
guessing what may be spent in the future.  Trigger funds also keep the 
public finance system current; rather than voters or the legislature having to 
tinker constantly with the disbursal amounts to keep up with trends in 
campaign spending, trigger funds adapt to any election in any year.35 
 
 30. For a detailed description of Arizona’s trigger funds provision, see infra notes 136–
39 and accompanying text. 
 31. McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 527 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 644 
(2010); see also McComish v. Brewer, No. CV-08-1550, 2010 WL 2292213, at *8 n.12 (D. 
Ariz. Jan. 20, 2010) (surmising that larger lump-sum disbursements are “not fiscally 
possible”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 32. See Rick Hasen, The Big Campaign Finance Story of 2011:  An Effective End to 
Public Financing, SUMMARY JUDGMENTS:  THE LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL, LOS ANGELES 
FACULTY BLOG (Nov. 28, 2010), http://summaryjudgments.lls.edu/2010/11/it-is-with-great-
pleasure.html; see also Amanda Terkel, Supreme Court Takes Aim Yet Again at Campaign 
Finance Laws, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 29, 2010, 4:48 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/29/supreme-court-clean-elections-law-mccomish-
bennett_n_789353.html (“Paul Ryan, associate legal counsel at the nonpartisan Campaign 
Legal Center . . . . also pointed to the multiple-match system as an alternative, although he 
argued that it’s unfortunately less efficient than the trigger system, which directed additional 
funds into the races that most needed them.”). But see Mimi Marziani, Reports of Public 
Financing’s Demise Are Exaggerated, ACSBLOG (June 10, 2010, 1:39 PM), 
http://www.acslaw.org/node/16340 (arguing that the elimination of trigger funds would not 
itself doom public financing). 
 33. Terkel, supra note 32 (“[Trigger funds] directed additional funds into the races that 
most needed them.”); see also supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 34. Kenneth N. Weine, Triggering the First Amendment:  Why Campaign Finance 
Systems That Include “Triggers” Are Constitutional, 24 J. LEGIS. 223, 236 (1998) (arguing 
that public funding must be set by looking at expenditures made during the race; 
“[o]therwise, in an era where a national organization can use a mail-house to send glossy 
campaign literature to every voter in a given district in a matter of days, candidates would 
face too volatile of a campaign spending market”). 
 35. Of course, trigger funds can only “adapt” to the extent allowed by their enabling 
statute, which may limit trigger funds disbursements. See, e.g., infra note 140 and 
accompanying text (noting that Arizona’s trigger funds provision caps extra funds at three 
times the initial disbursement). 
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However, not everyone is enamored of rescue funds.  As might be 
expected, traditional candidates who spend precious time and resources to 
fundraise take umbrage at a scheme that allows their opponents to benefit 
from their hard work.36  Conservative and libertarian critics of the law 
argue that trigger funds are not only unfair to specific private candidates, 
but more broadly constitute troubling government intrusion into electoral 
politics.37  Consequently, trigger funds regimes have long been the source 
of legal disputes.  Over the past two decades, several such candidates have 
taken their frustration to the federal courts.38 
B.  Buckley v. Valeo and the First Amendment Analysis 
The Supreme Court has declared that, due to the protections afforded by 
the First Amendment, state restrictions of speech based on content are 
presumptively invalid.39  Such laws are subject to strict scrutiny,40 requiring 
a showing that they are narrowly tailored to be the least restrictive means of 
achieving a compelling government interest.41  Courts take an especially 
hard look at laws that restrict political speech, which is “at the very core of 
the First Amendment.”42 
The precedential framework for First Amendment challenges to 
campaign finance laws derives from the Supreme Court’s landmark Buckley 
v. Valeo43 decision in 1976.44  The Court’s “long and oftentimes rambling 
 
 36. Consider the plight of former Congressman Matt Salmon, who ran against Janet 
Napolitano for Governor of Arizona in 2002.  According to Napolitano, a fundraiser for 
Salmon featuring President George W. Bush caused her campaign to receive $750,000 in 
trigger funds, leading Napolitano to joke:  “I am quite certain that I am the only Democratic 
Governor in the country for whom George Bush has held a fundraiser.”  Gov. Janet 
Napolitano, Money and Politics:  The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, A Living Constitution 
Lecture (Apr. 10, 2008), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-
/publications/Napolitano%20Speech%20FINAL.pdf.  
 37. See, e.g., Paul Sherman, The “Reform” View:  We Need Regulation Because You 
Vote Incorrectly, CONGRESS SHALL MAKE NO LAW:  IJ’S FREE SPEECH BLOG (Dec. 10, 2010, 
10:25 AM), http://makenolaw.org/blog/5-politicalspeech/148-the-reform-view-we-need-
regulation-because-you-vote-incorrectly (cautioning that “nothing could be more destructive 
of liberty than to give our elected officials control over speech about elected officials”); see 
also McComish v. Bennett (Clean Elections), GOLDWATER INST., 
http://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/case/68 (last visited Feb. 23, 2011) (describing trigger 
funds as “government interference in campaign activities”). 
 38. For descriptions of legal challenges to various trigger funds provisions, see infra 
Parts I.C, II.B–D. 
 39. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 933 (3d ed. 
2006). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 541–42. 
 42. Id. at 1070 (“If there is a hierarchy of protected speech, political speech occupies the 
top rung.”).  As discussed infra, however, the standard for campaign finance regulation is not 
explicitly strict scrutiny, but rather “exacting scrutiny.”  The Buckley Court did not clarify 
the distinctions between the two levels, but one might be that exacting scrutiny does not 
demand a showing that the regulation is the least restrictive alternative.  For a discussion of 
this possibility, see infra note 309 and accompanying text. 
 43. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 44. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 19, at 334. 
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opinion”45 briefly affirmed the constitutionality of public finance,46 but 
struck down several of the 1974 amendments to FECA.47  Finding that 
FECA’s restrictions on money in campaigns “operate in an area of the most 
fundamental First Amendment activities,” the Court held that they were 
therefore subject to “exacting scrutiny.”48 
However, the Court distinguished expenditures from contributions, and 
scrutinized them differently.  Expenditures, the Court reasoned, directly 
relate to the right of political expression because money is necessary to 
communicate with the electorate.49  Practically speaking, because money 
enables speech, the Court scrutinized expenditures as though they are 
speech.50  Adding to the Court’s skepticism about expenditure limits was its 
judgment that expenditures do not pose the same danger of corruption as 
contributions.51  Since the Court viewed corruption as quid pro quo,52 it 
concluded that candidates could not self-corrupt,53 and outside parties that 
make independent expenditures could not collude with the candidate and 
thus could not corrupt him either.54  Therefore, FECA’s limits on 
expenditures could not survive exacting scrutiny; indeed, the Court likened 
the law’s restrictions to “being free to drive an automobile as far and as 
often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline.”55 
The Court did not extend the same protection to contributions.  It found 
that, because giving money to a candidate communicates only support, but 
 
 45. Id. at 335. 
 46. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 47. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 19, at 334–35. 
 48. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14, 44–45. 
 49. Id. at 19 (“[V]irtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society 
requires the expenditure of money.”). 
 50. But see id. at 262 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he 
argument that money is speech and that limiting the flow of money to the speaker violates 
the First Amendment proves entirely too much.”); see also FEC v. Nat’l Conservative 
Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 508–09 (1985) (White, J. dissenting) 
(“[Expenditures] produce such speech; they are not speech itself.  At least in these 
circumstances, I cannot accept the identification of speech with its antecedents.”).  Scholars 
and commentators from across the ideological spectrum have criticized Buckley’s approach 
to evaluating expenditure restrictions, but a full analysis of these criticisms is beyond the 
scope of this Note.  For a brief discussion of some critiques of Buckley, see infra notes 320–
26 and accompanying text. 
 51. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46 (“[T]he independent advocacy restricted by the provision 
does not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those 
identified with large campaign contributions.”). 
 52. See id. at 26–28.  For a detailed discussion of Buckley’s definition of corruption and 
its ramifications, see infra Part III.B.1. 
 53. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 53 (finding that reliance on personal funds “reduces the 
candidate’s dependence on outside contributions and thereby counteracts the coercive 
pressures and attendant risks of abuse”). 
 54. See id. at 47 (“The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure 
with the candidate . . . alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo 
for improper commitments from the candidate.”). 
 55. Id. at 19 n.18. 
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not necessarily the reason for or level of support,56 statutory contribution 
limits are “only a marginal restriction” on free speech rights.57  
Contributions are political speech only insofar as they communicate “a 
general expression of support.”58  Therefore, capping them is 
constitutionally permissible because it is the act of giving, not the amount 
given, that the First Amendment protects.59 
Because of Buckley’s distinctions between expenditures and 
contributions, courts have since interpreted Buckley to mean that 
contributions are subject to a lower level of scrutiny.60  Accordingly, 
contribution limits are constitutional if “‘closely drawn’ to match a 
‘sufficiently important interest.’”61  Since most trigger funds provisions 
implicate both contributions and expenditures, however, the level of 
scrutiny to be applied is a source of some confusion.  That trigger funds 
provisions impose no actual cap on speech, unlike the provisions that 
Buckley contemplated, further complicates the scrutiny level inquiry.  As 
will be discussed below, lower courts have approached the scrutiny 
question in different ways. 
C.  The Pre-Davis v. FEC Circuit Split 
As Part I.D below discusses, the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Davis 
v. FEC62 has altered the framework under which federal courts analyze 
trigger funds provisions.  Prior to Davis, however, three circuits had ruled 
on the constitutionality of trigger funds.  This section reviews this pre-
Davis circuit split, which existed between 2000 and 2008. 
1.  “The Most Fundamental of Rights Is Infringed”:  The Eighth Circuit 
Strikes Down Trigger Funds in Day v. Holahan 
The first circuit court to review a trigger funds regime took a dim view of 
the practice and ruled it unconstitutional.63  In 1994, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed Minnesota’s campaign finance 
statute after a coalition of political candidates and donors challenged the 
law’s constitutionality.64  Rather than matching all of an opponent’s funds, 
 
 56. Id. at 21 & n.22 (finding that the contribution amount is “at most” only a “very 
rough index” of the donor’s level of support, and is only one of several factors that also 
include the donor’s “financial ability”). 
 57. Id. at 20–21. 
 58. Id. at 21. 
 59. See id. (“The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase 
perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the 
undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing.”). 
 60. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387 (2000) (“It has, in any 
event, been plain ever since Buckley that contribution limits would more readily clear the 
hurdles before them [than expenditure limits].” (citing Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign 
Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 610 (1996))); ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 19, at 337. 
 61. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 387–88 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30). 
 62. 554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
 63. See Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1361–62 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 64. See id. at 1358–60. 
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the Minnesota system implicated only independent expenditures.65  
Moreover, it did not match the expenditures dollar-for-dollar; instead, it 
disbursed one-half of the expenditure’s amount to the adversely affected 
candidate while raising the ceiling on her own expenditures.66 
Holding that the raised ceiling and trigger funds actually “impaired” the 
speech of those making independent expenditures, the Eighth Circuit struck 
down the Minnesota statute.67  The court found that, because “the 
individual or group intending to contribute to [a candidate’s] defeat 
becomes directly responsible for adding to her campaign coffers,” the 
trigger funds provision chilled the free exercise of protected speech.68  The 
court likened this chilling effect to government censorship,69 and although 
acknowledging that such a burden could potentially be justified by a state 
interest, the court suggested that it would apply strict scrutiny, rather than 
the Buckley “exacting scrutiny” standard.70 
The Eighth Circuit could not identify such a state interest.  Given that 
almost all Minnesota candidates participated in public financing before the 
enactment of the trigger funds provision, the court instead concluded that 
further incentivizing the public system could not possibly be justified.71  
Accordingly, it declared the provision unconstitutional.72 
2.  “No Right To Speak Free from Response”:  The First and Fourth 
Circuits Uphold Trigger Funds in Daggett and Leake 
The next two circuit courts to evaluate trigger funds reached a different 
result than the Eighth Circuit.  In 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
 
 65. See id. at 1359–60 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.25 subd. 13(a) (1993)).  The 
term “independent expenditure” generally refers to an expenditure made independently of a 
candidate’s campaign, i.e., an advertisement created and aired by a union or interest group. 
See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2006). 
 66. Day, 34 F.3d at 1359–60. 
 67. See id. at 1360. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. (“This ‘self-censorship’ that has occurred even before the state implements the 
statute’s mandates is no less a burden on speech that is susceptible to constitutional 
challenge than is direct government censorship.”). 
 70. See id. at 1361 (“[T]he statute may be upheld as against constitutional challenge if 
the state can show that it is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.”).  It is 
unclear how this relates to the Buckley Court’s “exacting scrutiny” standard. See supra note 
42, infra note 309 and accompanying text. 
 71. See Day, 34 F.3d at 1361.  Because the Eighth Circuit’s dismissal of the interest 
analysis is highly specific to the circumstances of Minnesota public finance, it is not 
necessarily applicable to other jurisdictions.  This is especially likely for those states that had 
no public financing system before the passage of the legislation that included trigger funds 
(such as Arizona). 
 72. See id. at 1362.  Two years later, the Eighth Circuit upheld other portions of 
Minnesota’s campaign finance statute, including a provision that removed spending limits 
for opponents of well-funded candidates. See Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544 (8th 
Cir. 1996).  Rosenstiel has been interpreted as calling the precedential value of Day into 
question. See McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 523 n.9 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 131 S. 
Ct. 644 (2010) (“We decline to follow the Eighth Circuit down a road that even it refused to 
follow.”); Daggett v. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics and Elections Practices, 205 F.3d 
445, 465 n.25 (1st Cir. 2000) (describing Day’s status as “open to question”). 
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First Circuit heard a broad challenge to the Maine Clean Elections Act.73  
Maine’s statute matches dollar-for-dollar contributions and expenditures 
made against the public candidate.74  However, it caps the trigger funds at 
double the initial disbursement.75 
As part of the challenge, the plaintiffs76 made three principal arguments 
against trigger funds.  First, they contended that the trigger funds chill and 
penalize the speech of the nonparticipating candidates and those making 
independent expenditures on their behalf.77  Second, the plaintiffs claimed 
that trigger funds violated their freedom of association because the 
provision “forces them to be associated with candidates they oppose by in 
effect facilitating their speech.”78  Finally, the plaintiffs argued that trigger 
funds negate the only significant burden of participating in public 
financing—the public candidate’s pledge “not to accept any private 
contributions and not to make expenditures except from disbursements 
made to [her] from the [public] [f]und.”79  The plaintiffs therefore alleged 
that trigger funds cause the public financing regime to be “impermissibly 
coercive—that is, it provides so many incentives to participate and so many 
detriments to foregoing participation that it leaves a candidate with no 
reasonable alternative” but to enroll.80 
Departing from the Eighth Circuit’s rationale, the First Circuit found that 
trigger funds do not burden First Amendment rights.81  It reached this 
conclusion largely because the Maine statute imposed no active ban or cap 
on spending by nonparticipating candidates.82  Quoting the Supreme 
Court’s pronouncement that the First Amendment’s purpose is to “secure 
the ‘widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources,’”83 the First Circuit reasoned that the Amendment 
protects “no right to speak free from response.”84 
The First Circuit also disregarded the plaintiffs’ association and coercion 
claims.  Freedom of association was not burdened, the court reasoned, 
because no actual association occurred between the plaintiffs and the 
 
 73. Daggett, 205 F.3d at 450. 
 74. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1125(9) (2010).  This includes those of the 
nonparticipating candidate’s campaign as well as independent expenditures. Id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. The plaintiffs included candidates for state office, contributors, political action 
committees, and the Libertarian Party of Maine. See Daggett, 205 F.3d at 450. 
 77. Id. at 463–64. 
 78. Id. at 464. 
 79. Id. at 451 (citing tit. 21-A, § 1125(6)). 
 80. Id. at 466. 
 81. See id. at 464. 
 82. See id. (“[T]he Maine statute creates no direct restriction. . . . [It] in no way limits 
the quantity of speech one can engage in or the amount of money one can spend engaging in 
political speech, nor does it threaten censure or penalty for such expenditures.”).  For a 
discussion of how Davis v. FEC rendered this analysis moot, see infra Part I.D. 
 83. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1963)). 
 84. Daggett, 205 F.3d at 464 (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 
U.S. 1, 14 (1986) (finding no right to speak “free from vigorous debate”)). 
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candidates they opposed.85  Nor was the trigger funds provision coercive, 
both because of its cap at two times the initial disbursement and because the 
nonparticipating opponent “holds the key as to how much and at what time 
the participant receives matching funds.”86  Having determined that the 
Maine statute did not burden any First Amendment rights, the court 
declined to reach the question of the state’s interest.87 
In 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit weighed in on 
the trigger funds question.88  The appeal concerned North Carolina’s 
Judicial Campaign Reform Act, a clean elections statute affecting appellate 
judicial candidates.89  The statute allows trigger funds to be disbursed to the 
participating candidate if the amount of money spent or raised against her or 
on behalf of her nonparticipating opponent exceeds a predetermined trigger 
amount.90  It caps the total trigger funds available at twice that trigger 
amount.91  However, at the time of the Fourth Circuit decision, the statute 
included a ban on contributions to the nonparticipating opponent during the 
last twenty-one days of a general election if such contributions would 
trigger additional funds.92 
Echoing the First Circuit’s Daggett analysis, the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that the trigger funds provision creates no First Amendment 
burden because it does not impose any actual cap or penalty on speech.93  
Although trigger funds do empower the nonparticipating candidate’s 
opponent, the court found that this “‘furthers, not abridges, pertinent First 
Amendment values’ by ensuring that the participating [opponent] will have 
an opportunity to engage in responsive speech.”94  The court also 
disregarded any actual deterrent effect of the trigger funds provision as 
emanating “from a strategic, political choice, not from a threat of 
government censure or prosecution.”95  Like the First Circuit, the Fourth 
Circuit did not consider the state interest behind trigger funds once it 
determined that they posed no First Amendment burden. 
 
 85. See id. at 465 (“[A]ppellants’ freedom of association is not burdened because their 
names and messages are not associated—in any way indicative of support—with the 
candidate they oppose.”). 
 86. Id. at 468. 
 87. See id. at 464–65 & 465 n.26.  
 88. N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 
427 (4th Cir. 2008).  This was the last circuit court ruling on trigger funds before the 
Supreme Court announced its Davis decision.  For more information on Davis, see infra Part 
I.D. 
 89. See Leake, 524 F.3d at 432. 
 90. See id. at 433 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-278.67 (West 2010)).  The “funds 
in opposition” amount to be matched by the trigger funds includes both monies raised or 
spent by the nonparticipating opponent (whichever is greater) as well as independent 
expenditures for the opponent or against the public candidate. Id. (citing § 163-278.67(a)).  
The statute defines the trigger amount as either the maximum qualifying contributions 
amount (for the primary) or the initial disbursement amount. § 163-278.62. 
 91. See Leake, 524 F.3d at 433 (citing § 163-278.67(a–c)). 
 92. See id. at 434 (citing § 163-278.13(e2)(3) (repealed 2008)). 
 93. See id. at 437. 
 94. Id. at 437 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92–93 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 95. Id. at 438. 
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Thus, there were three circuit court decisions on trigger funds leading up 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. FEC.  One court found that 
trigger funds constituted a burden akin to government censorship that could 
not survive “even the most cursory scrutiny.”96  The other two circuit 
courts, however, found that trigger funds constituted no burden 
whatsoever.97  Remarkably, none of these analyses gave any thought to the 
state interest involved.  Each turned almost exclusively on the question of 
whether a law that implicated—but did not directly cap—contributions and 
expenditures burdened First Amendment rights.  This was the question that 
the Supreme Court settled in Davis. 
D.  The Supreme Court Upends the Burden Analysis in Davis v. FEC 
This section will discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. 
FEC.98  It will explain how the Court viewed the First Amendment as 
primarily protecting speakers instead of speech.  Part I.D will then recount 
the various responses to Justice Alito’s opinion, concluding by explaining 
the decision’s significance for trigger funds analysis. 
1.  “An Unprecedented Penalty”:  The Davis Opinion 
In Davis, the Supreme Court evaluated the Millionaire’s Amendment to 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).99  The Millionaire’s 
Amendment, which was designed in part to mitigate the windfall that 
campaign finance restrictions heaped on wealthy candidates,100 called for a 
calculation of candidates’ “opposition personal funds amount.”101  If this 
calculation determined that the self-financed candidate possessed a financial 
advantage of more than $350,000, the Millionaire’s Amendment altered 
some of the BCRA’s provisions.102  Specifically, the self-financed 
candidate’s opponent became eligible to receive contributions at triple the 
previous limit (raising the cap to $6,900), as well as unlimited party 
expenditures.103  However, the normal restrictions returned once the 
 
 96. Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1362 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 97. See Leake, 524 F.3d at 437; Daggett v. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics and 
Elections Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 464–65 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 98. 554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
 99. Davis, 554 U.S. at 729. 
 100. Brief for Appellee at 33–34, Davis, 554 U.S. 724 (No. 07-320), 2008 WL 742921 at 
*33 (arguing that “Congress sought partially to restore that ‘normal relationship’” between 
resources and support that contribution limits had wrought in the absence of corresponding 
expenditure limits); see also Davis, 554 U.S. at 743 (“[The Millionaire’s Amendment] can 
be seen, not as a legislative effort to interfere with the natural operation of the electoral 
process, but as a legislative effort to mitigate the untoward consequences of Congress’ own 
handiwork . . . .”). 
 101. Davis, 554 U.S. at 729 (citing Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. 
§ 441a-1(a)).  This amount is obtained “by adding each candidate’s expenditure of personal 
funds to 50% of the funds raised from contributors.” Richard M. Esenberg, The Lonely 
Death of Public Campaign Financing, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 319 n.222 (2010). 
 102. Davis, 554 U.S. at 729. 
 103. Id. (citing Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 441a-1(A)–(C)). 
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opponent caught up to the self-financed candidate.104  To facilitate these 
modifications, the Millionaire’s Amendment also imposed a scheme of 
disclosure requirements on self-financing candidates.105 
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito held that the Millionaire’s 
Amendment “impermissibly burden[ed] [the plaintiff’s] First Amendment 
right to spend his own money for campaign speech.”106  To the majority, it 
did not matter that the Millionaire’s Amendment stopped short of imposing 
a hard limit on expenditures, which had been a feature of the legislation 
struck down in Buckley.107  It was enough that the statute attached a 
“special and potentially significant burden” to the constitutionally-protected 
choice to spend one’s own money on political speech.108  Nor did the Court 
look to whether there was any evidence that the Millionaire’s Amendment 
had actually chilled speech.109  Rather, it reasoned that because the 
regulation assisted the self-financed candidate’s opponent, that assistance 
correspondingly created a substantial burden on the candidate.110 
To make matters worse, unlike a publicly-funded candidate who 
voluntarily accepts funding restrictions, there was no way for a self-
financed candidate to opt out or escape from the Millionaire’s 
Amendment’s grasp.111  The only thing the self-financed candidate could 
do to keep his opponent’s traditional limits in place was to withhold 
spending his own money.112  This presented a clear impediment to his 
ability to “engage in the discussion of public issues and vigorously and 
tirelessly to advocate his own election.”113 
Concluding that the Millionaire’s Amendment imposed a substantial 
burden on the self-financed candidate’s First Amendment rights, the Court 
turned to the interest analysis.114  It immediately rejected the possibility that 
 
 104. Id. (citing Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 441a-1(a)(3)). 
 105. Id. at 730 (citing Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 441a-1(b)(1)(B)). 
 106. Id. at 738. 
 107. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7 (1976) (per curiam). 
 108. Davis, 554 U.S. at 739.  Justice Alito’s opinion goes to some length to explain how 
such a burden on a candidate’s choices is unconstitutional. See id. (“The resulting drag on 
First Amendment rights is not constitutional simply because it attaches as a consequence of a 
statutorily imposed choice. . . . [T]he choice involved in Buckley was quite different from the 
choice imposed by [the Millionaire’s Amendment].”). 
 109. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Davis, 554 U.S. 724 (No. 07-320) 
2008 WL 1803646 (“Do we usually evaluate restrictions on First Amendment rights on the 
basis of whether the chill that was imposed by the government was actually effective in 
stifling the right? . . .  If the person goes ahead and speaks anyway, is he estopped from 
saying that the government was chilling his speech nonetheless? . . .  Isn’t that what’s going 
on here?” (Scalia, J.)). 
 110. Davis, 554 U.S. at 739 (“Under [Millionaire’s Amendment] § 319(a), the vigorous 
exercise of the right to use personal funds to finance campaign speech produces fundraising 
advantages for opponents in the competitive context of electoral politics.”); see also 
Esenberg, supra note 101, at 318 (“Helping [o]ne [s]ide [b]urdens the [o]ther”). 
 111. Davis, 554 U.S. at 739–40 (“In Buckley, a candidate, by forgoing public financing, 
could retain the unfettered right to make unlimited personal expenditures.  Here, § 319(a) 
does not provide any way in which a candidate can exercise that right without abridgment.”). 
 112. See id. at 740. 
 113. Id. at 738 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52–53 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 114. See id. at 740. 
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the Millionaire’s Amendment could have any anticorruption effect, 
reasoning that “reliance on personal funds reduces the threat of 
corruption.”115  The remaining justification, leveling electoral opportunities, 
was also pilloried.116  The Court’s objection was not that the Millionaire’s 
Amendment did not further that interest; rather, the Court refused to 
recognize the interest itself.117  Leveling electoral opportunities, it wrote, 
“means making and implementing judgments about which strengths should 
be permitted to contribute to the outcome of an election.”118  Because this 
could not qualify as a legitimate state interest, the Millionaire’s Amendment 
could not stand. 
2.  Reflections on Davis, and Its Implications for Trigger Funds 
Editorial reactions to the Davis decision were swift and predictable.  
Although the Wall Street Journal was pleased with the decision,119 the New 
York Times lambasted the opinion as “conservative judicial activism of the 
first order.”120  The Washington Post was less concerned about the 
Millionaire’s Amendment, however, and instead worried what the decision 
meant for trigger funds provisions across the country.121 
Legal commentators asked the same question.  Rick Hasen, a prominent 
election law professor and author of Election Law Blog, questioned whether 
public financing systems that tie “special benefits” to opposition spending 
could survive.122  Similarly, Professor Richard M. Esenberg concluded that, 
in the wake of Davis, “asymmetrical schemes of public financing that 
provide additional funding . . . in response to independent expenditures are 
 
 115. Id.; see also Esenberg, supra note 101, at 319 (“Self-financed candidates, [the 
majority] reasoned, cannot ‘corrupt’ themselves.”). 
 116. See Davis, 554 U.S. at 741. 
 117. See id. (finding “no support for the proposition that [leveling electoral opportunities] 
is a legitimate government objective” (citing Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 
428 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting))). 
 118. Id. at 742. 
 119. See Editorial, Justices for Free Speech, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2008, at A10, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121460646723712065.html. 
 120. Editorial, It’s Nice to be Rich, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2008, at A16, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/28/opinion/28sat3.html. 
 121. Editorial, Millionaires Win, WASH. POST, June 29, 2008, at B6, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/28/
AR2008062801751.html (dismissing the loss of the Millionaire’s Amendment as 
“unfortunate but not disastrous” but characterizing the Davis Court’s opinion and its citation 
to Day v. Holahan therein as “[t]he bigger threat”). 
 122. See Rick Hasen, Initial Thoughts on FEC v. Davis:  The Court Primes the Pump for 
Striking Down Corporate and Union Campaign Spending Limits and Blows a Hole in 
Effective Public Financing Plans, ELECTION LAW BLOG (June 26, 2008, 7:55 AM), 
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/011095.html. 
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presumably unconstitutional.”123  Opponents of campaign finance saw the 
same implication in Justice Alito’s opinion.124 
That a majority of the Roberts Court viewed the prevention of quid pro 
quo as the only constitutional rationale for campaign finance legislation was 
perhaps unsurprising.125  Davis was nevertheless a milestone for trigger 
funds analysis because it tempered Buckley’s vision of the First 
Amendment as seeking “‘the widest possible dissemination of information 
from diverse and antagonistic sources.’”126  Although Buckley had warned 
that “the First Amendment simply cannot tolerate [a] restriction upon the 
freedom of a candidate to speak without legislative limit on behalf of his 
own candidacy,”127 Davis redefined “legislative limit” to include legislation 
that, in fact, imposed no limit whatsoever.128  The question that had divided 
lower courts about the burden imposed by trigger funds—whether a 
regulation that implicates expenditures but stops short of capping them is a 
burden on First Amendment rights—had been answered with a resounding 
“yes.”129 
But while the Millionaire’s Amendment served no anticorruption interest, 
Davis said nothing about whether public financing statutes that include 
trigger funds provisions prevent corruption.130  If they do, then they might 
be constitutional despite the substantial burden they likely impose on 
speech.  This was the possibility that faced the District of Arizona in 
McComish v. Brewer.131 
 
 123. Esenberg, supra note 101, at 321–22. But see Case Comment, Campaign Finance 
Regulation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 375, 380–85 (2008) (arguing that “Davis is hardly the 
warning shot these commentators think it is” because their reading “oversimplifies the 
Court’s reasoning and ignores a crucial First Amendment distinction between government 
promotion of speech and government restriction of speech”). 
 124. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Davis:  Leveling Rich Candidates’ Speech Unjustified, THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER AT VAND. U. (June 30, 2008), 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=20238 (“‘Candidates have a First 
Amendment right to fund their own speech without being burdened by government provision 
of benefits to their opponents.  This has broad implication for public-funding schemes.’”). 
 125. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 428 (2000) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“As we have noted, ‘preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are 
the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting 
campaign finances.’” (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 
480, 496–97 (1985))). 
 126. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Associated Press v. 
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). 
 127. Id. at 54. 
 128. See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 130. See Case Comment, supra note 123, at 385 (“[Davis] says nothing of asymmetrical 
funding schemes and therefore says nothing about their constitutionality.”). 
 131. See McComish v. Brewer, No. CV-08-1550, 2010 WL 2292213, at *7 (D. Ariz. Jan. 
20, 2010), rev’d sub nom. McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 131 
S. Ct. 644 (2010) (“While Davis is instructive, it does not answer the precise question now 
before the Court.”). 
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II.  THE CURRENT TRIGGER FUNDS CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Part II analyzes the current trigger funds conflict and explains how courts 
have addressed the question of whether trigger funds can exist post-Davis.  
It focuses specifically on the legal dispute over Arizona’s clean elections 
legislation, which will soon be before the Supreme Court.  First, this part 
explains Arizona’s Citizens Clean Elections Act.  It then explores the 
district court’s decision about the Act in McComish v. Brewer, as well as 
the Ninth Circuit’s reversal in McComish v. Bennett, and the Supreme 
Court’s order reinstating the District Court’s injunction.  Finally, Part II 
summarizes subsequent rulings on trigger funds by the Second, Eleventh, 
and First Circuits in the months preceding the 2010 elections. 
A.  Arizona’s Citizens Clean Elections Act 
The road to clean elections legislation was a particularly bumpy one for 
Arizona.  Between 1986 and 1997, both Arizona senators, two consecutive 
governors, nine state legislators, and many other political actors were 
implicated in various corruption scandals.132  The illegal activity ranged 
from racketeering and fraud to extortion and bribery.133 
It is hardly surprising, then, that the voters of Arizona passed a ballot 
initiative known as the Citizens Clean Elections Act in 1998.134  Section 
16-940 declared the Act’s intent “to create a clean elections system that 
[would] improve the integrity of Arizona state government by diminishing 
the influence of special-interest money, [would] encourage citizen 
participation in the political process, and [would] promote freedom of 
speech.”135  The Act rewards candidates who have received a minimum 
number136 of five-dollar qualifying contributions with a disbursement of 
public funds,137 almost all of which come from voluntary tax check-offs, 
tax credits, and a 10% surcharge on court assessments.138  If such a 
participating candidate is outspent by her nonparticipating opponent, or if 
 
 132. See McComish, 611 F.3d at 514 (referencing Arizona’s myriad corruption scandals).  
See generally Barnes, supra note 1; AZSCAM Ushered in New Era of Clean Government 
(KPHO CBS 5 News Television Broadcast Dec. 9, 2008), available at 
http://www.kpho.com/video/18240345/index.html (discussing AZScam and the consequent 
push for Clean Elections legislation). 
 133. See McComish, 611 F.3d at 514; see also Sally Ann Stewart, New Tarnish on 
Arizona’s Image, USA TODAY, Feb. 13, 1991, at 6A. 
 134. See Brewer, 2010 WL 2292213, at *1; see also Barnes, supra note 1.  Despite all of 
these scandals, the Act only passed with about 51% of the vote. Brewer, 2010 WL 2292213, 
at *2. 
 135. Brewer, 2010 WL 2292213, at *1 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-940(A) 
(2006)). 
 136. § 16-950(D) (setting out the minimum number of qualifying contributions for each 
office sought). 
 137. § 16-951.  Public candidates get this lump disbursement at the start of both the 
primary and the general election.  Brewer, 2010 WL 2292213, at *2. 
 138. See Funding– CCEC, CITIZENS CLEAN ELECTIONS COMMISSION, 
http://www.azcleanelections.gov/about-us/funding.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2011); see also 
Napolitano, supra note 36 (“[A]lmost two thirds of Clean Election funding derives from 
surcharges on civil penalties and criminal fines like parking tickets, and about one third 
comes from voluntary check-offs on the state’s tax return.”). 
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there are independent expenditures made against her or for her opponent, 
then she receives “matching” or “trigger” funds—the difference between 
what she was initially disbursed and how much has been spent against 
her.139  However, she cannot receive more than three times her initial 
grant.140  “Simply, there are no consequences once a nonparticipating 
candidate has raised or spent more than three times the initial grant.”141 
B.  The District of Arizona’s McComish v. Brewer Decision 
1.  A Challenge to the Act 
On August 21, 2008, the Goldwater Institute filed a complaint in the 
District of Arizona, alleging that the trigger funds provision of the Act 
posed an unconstitutional burden on the right to free political speech.142  
The plaintiffs in the action143 asserted that the Act unconstitutionally chilled 
their speech.144  Also arguing on behalf of the plaintiffs was the Institute for 
Justice, a “libertarian public interest law firm”145 that has been mounting 
challenges to the Act since at least 2004.146 
The plaintiffs first tried to obtain a temporary restraining order against 
the distribution of trigger funds.147  Judge Roslyn O. Silver found that 
success on the merits was probable, but that the balance of harms weighed 
against intervening in the then-ongoing 2008 primary.148  She therefore 
denied the motion149 and similarly denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a 
preliminary injunction less than three weeks before the general election.150  
However, Judge Silver’s candid assessment of the plaintiffs’ chance of 
success on the merits clearly signaled how the court was likely to rule after 
a full trial. 
 
 139. Brewer, 2010 WL 2292213, at *2 (citing § 16-952). 
 140. Id. at *3. 
 141. Id. 
 142. McComish v. Bennett (Clean Elections), THE GOLDWATER INST., 
http://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/case/68 (last visited Feb. 23, 2011). 
 143. For a more detailed discussion of these plaintiffs, see infra notes 159–67 and 
accompanying text. 
 144. Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 3, Brewer, 2010 WL 2292213 (No. CV-08-1550), 
2009 WL 6769421. 
 145. About IJ:  Our Vision, THE INST. FOR JUSTICE, http://www.ij.org/about (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2011). 
 146. See, e.g., Press Release, Institute for Justice, IJ Asks Federal Court to Enjoin 
Arizona’s “Clean” Elections Act (Feb. 19, 2004), available at 
http://www.ij.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1235&Itemid=165; see 
also Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Ariz. 2005) 
(challenging the Act). 
 147. See Brewer, 2010 WL 2292213 (No. CV-08-1550) (denying motion for temporary 
restraining order). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Brewer, 2010 WL 2292213 (No. CV-08-1550) (denying motion for preliminary 
injunction).  The court further found that “[t]he delay [after Davis] of almost two months 
before any action was filed in this court has to bear against the urgency of Plaintiffs’ claim 
and certainly mitigated against any real possibility that participating candidates might have 
time, after an injunction, to develop their own fundraising strategy.” Id. at *18. 
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2.  What Exactly Is the Burden? 
In determining the standard of review, the district court engaged in a 
bifurcated inquiry, the first part of which was the type of speech potentially 
burdened by the Act.151  Because the Act affected expenditures (including 
self-financing) as well as outside contributions, the district court concluded 
that the Act’s burden, if any, was to be evaluated as implicating fully 
protected speech.152  In doing so, the court disregarded Arizona’s claim that 
the Act mainly restricted contributions.153  This aspect of the Act—its link 
not only to outside contributions but also to a candidate’s ability to speak on 
behalf of her own candidacy—would prove crucial to the district court’s 
decision.154 
The second part of the bifurcated inquiry, evaluating the Act’s burden on 
speech, was trickier.  In its findings of fact, the court had reviewed the 
plaintiffs’ testimony on this subject.  To demonstrate a burden, the plaintiffs 
had testified that they would have spent more money, or would have done 
so differently, but for the specter of matching funds.155  The defendants 
countered, however, that if speech had actually been chilled, “one would 
expect to find candidates spend just up to but no more than the spending 
limit.”156  The court did not credit either of these interpretations, finding 
only that the testimony was inconclusive as to the Act’s chilling effect.157 
Nor did Judge Silver seem particularly impressed by the individual 
plaintiffs’ claims about the Act’s effect on their own campaigns.  After 
making individual findings of fact about each plaintiff, , the court noted that 
the plaintiffs had complained of discrimination but confessed itself “unable 
to conceive of how an award of matching funds ‘discriminates’ against” 
non-participating candidates.158  The court noted that one plaintiff, Nancy 
McClain, had not raised or spent enough money to trigger additional 
funds.159  Similarly, the Arizona Taxpayers Action Committee had no 
money and thus was in no practical danger of triggering trigger funds.160  
Another plaintiff organization, the Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom 
Club PAC, never actually made independent expenditures on behalf of 
candidates.161  Rick Murphy ran in 2004 as a public candidate, and had 
 
 151. Brewer, 2010 WL 2292213, at *6. 
 152. See id. at *7. 
 153. See id. 
 154. See McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 526 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 
644 (2010) (noting that the district court “concluded that the Act did not further an 
anticorruption interest by providing matching funds to participating candidates triggered by 
non-participating candidates making contributions to their own campaigns from their own 
private funds”). 
 155. Brewer, 2010 WL 2292213, at *3. 
 156. Id. (“In other words, candidates would attempt to spend the maximum amount they 
are able to spend without triggering matching funds.”) 
 157. See id. 
 158. See id. at *4. 
 159. See id. 
 160. See id. at *6. 
 161. See id. at *5. 
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accepted public funds.162  In fact, one of Mr. Murphy’s political consultants 
testified that in his opinion, Mr. Murphy would have lost the race without 
them.163 
Two plaintiffs, Tony Bouie and John McComish, testified that they had 
triggered additional funds for their opponents in the past and were forced to 
spend strategically to minimize their impact.164  However, the court 
believed that trigger funds were largely irrelevant to the campaign of Robert 
Burns, concluding that “Mr. Burns simply communicated his message to 
the extent he felt necessary to win.”165  Perhaps most telling in Judge 
Silver’s eyes was the testimony of Dean Martin, who could not remember if 
he had ever triggered extra funds to an opponent.166  Of this uncertainty, the 
court observed, “if matching funds were a serious concern, Mr. Martin 
would know whether he had triggered such funds.”167 
Despite the court’s dissatisfaction with the plaintiffs’ “scattered” and 
“vague” explanation of the burden,168 it too had difficulty with this aspect 
of the analysis.  Even before it analyzed the severity of the burden, the court 
first had to establish that such a burden existed.  This question contained 
both practical and theoretical quandaries.  When considered practically, the 
targeting of trigger funds specifically was counterintuitive.169  Given that 
Buckley affirmed the constitutionality of public financing in lump sums,170 
the court found it difficult to ascertain how providing incremental (in effect, 
smaller) grants could be objectionable.171  The plaintiffs’ argument, taken 
to its logical conclusion, was that the government is permitted to give their 
participating opponents a large sum of money at the start of the campaign, 
but giving those opponents smaller disbursements that could not exceed the 
plaintiffs’ own spending violates the Constitution.  For example, “an award 
under the current regime of $25,000 (the initial grant plus some matching 
funds) violates their rights, but an award of twice that amount (not based on 
matching funds) would not.”172 
Buckley caused problems for the plaintiffs on a theoretical level as well.  
There, the Supreme Court had held that the First Amendment existed “to 
secure ‘the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. at *5 n.10. 
 164. See id. at *3–4. 
 165. Id. at *5. 
 166. See id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at *3. 
 169. See id. at *8. 
 170. Id. (“If the Act provided for a single lump sum award, instead of incremental 
awards, the law would fall squarely within the regime blessed in Buckley and reaffirmed in 
Davis.”). 
 171. See id. 
 172. Id. at *8 n.13.  The court noted that the plaintiffs were not afraid to make this 
argument because most states cannot afford to disburse the higher, constitutionally-approved 
lump sums. See id. at *8 n.12. 
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antagonistic sources.’”173  Given this explicit preference for increasing the 
aggregate amount of speech, Judge Silver found it “illogical to conclude 
that the Act creating more speech is a constitutionally prohibited ‘burden’ 
on” nonparticipating candidates.174  From this perspective, the Act’s effect 
of securing a greater amount of political speech furthered, not hindered, the 
First Amendment’s goal. 
Ultimately, however, Judge Silver concluded that the Supreme Court’s 
Davis decision forced her to find a substantial burden upon the plaintiffs.175  
First, the court reasoned that trigger funds caused the same “negative 
consequence” for a nonparticipating candidate as the Millionaire’s 
Amendment had in Davis:  if he spends more than a certain amount set by 
the campaign finance regime, his opponent is empowered to spend more as 
well.176  The District Court also cited with approval to the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Connecticut’s Green Party of Connecticut v. 
Garfield decision, which found that trigger funds are even more 
constitutionally objectionable than the Millionaire’s Amendment because 
they actually put money in the opponent’s hand rather than making her 
work for it.177 
The District Court stopped short of precisely articulating the burden that 
the trigger funds provision imposed.  It merely remarked that the dilemma 
the provision creates for private candidates mirrored that created by the 
Millionaire’s Amendment in Davis.178  It seems that, to the district court, 
the coupling of disbursing public funds (an otherwise constitutional event) 
directly to an action by the nonparticipating opponent constituted the 
burden.179  To be burdensome by this logic, a law need only impose a 
disincentive upon an action that the court has deemed a fully protected 
action—even if that disincentive is so minor as to be easily overcome by the 
incentives to perform that action.  The plaintiff John McComish understood 
that his expenditures would trigger additional funds, but chose to make 
them anyway because the benefits of spending the money outweighed the 
detriment.180  Yet even though it was likely an easy decision for 
McComish, that he was subjected to negative effects at all (or perhaps even 
 
 173. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Associated Press v. 
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). 
 174. Brewer, 2010 WL 2292213, at *7. 
 175. Id. at *8. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. (citing Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 648 F. Supp. 2d 298, 373 (D. Conn. 
2009), rev’d, 616 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 9, 2010) (No. 
10-795)).  For a discussion of the Second Circuit’s subsequent review of this case, see infra 
Part II.D.2.a. 
 178. Id. (“Plaintiffs face a choice very similar to that faced in Davis:  either ‘abide by a 
limit on personal expenditures’ or face potentially serious negative consequences.” (quoting 
Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 740 (2008))). 
 179. For a discussion of Davis’s similar line of reasoning, see supra note 108 and 
accompanying text. 
 180. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (noting that McComish had triggered 
additional funds to his public opponent). 
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the possibility of negative effects) was enough to violate the First 
Amendment’s protections under the district court’s analysis.181 
3.  The Burden Is Not Justified 
The district court next set out to determine the weight of the trigger funds 
provision’s burden on the plaintiffs’ speech.  Here, Judge Silver made no 
attempt to hide her frustration with the Davis Court: 
Unfortunately, Davis provided no guidance on how the statute at issue 
constituted a “substantial burden” on the plaintiffs’ rights.  After 
explaining its holding that discriminatory fundraising limitations 
constituted a burden, the Davis court jumped to the conclusion that the 
burden was “substantial.”  This ipse dixit was announced “without the 
slightest veneer of reasoning to shield the obvious fiat by which it [was] 
reached.”182 
Once again, however, the district court felt bound by Davis:  if the 
Millionaire’s Amendment had been a substantial burden, albeit for no 
discernible reason, then trigger funds must also be such a burden.183  
Accordingly, the court ruled that the Act was subject to strict scrutiny.184 
After arriving at the standard of review, the court made short work of the 
constitutional analysis.  It noted that the only compelling state interest in 
promulgating campaign finance legislation is preventing quid pro quo 
corruption or the appearance of such corruption.185  But it could not square 
that anticorruption interest with what it perceived to be the Act’s burden on 
candidates who self-finance their own campaigns.186  Accordingly, it held 
that the Act was not supported by a compelling interest.187  From this, the 
conclusion followed that the trigger funds provision was not the least 
restrictive alternative and therefore not narrowly tailored.188  Because of the 
aforementioned burden on self-financed candidates in particular, the court 
found that “the Act ‘significantly restrict[ed] a substantial quantity of 
speech that does not create’ the appearance of corruption.”189 
 
 181. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text (explaining Davis’s similar 
analysis). 
 182. Brewer, 2010 WL 2292213, at *8 (quoting Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 552 
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id.  See supra notes 42, 70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
relationship between strict scrutiny and Buckley’s exacting scrutiny standard. 
 185. Brewer, 2010 WL 2292213, at *9 (citing Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 
377, 389–90 (2000)). 
 186. Id.  The court quoted the Davis court’s conclusion that “‘reliance on personal funds 
reduces the threat of corruption’ and ‘discouraging use of personal funds disserves the 
anticorruption interest.’” Id. (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 740–41 (2008)). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 n.7 (1989)).  The 
court acknowledged Arizona’s claim that trigger funds are designed not to deter self-
financing but rather to “incentivize participation in the public financing system thereby 
reducing the risk of corruption” but considered it unresponsive to the question at issue. Id. at 
*9 n.17. 
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The district court concluded its First Amendment analysis with an 
intriguing suggestion.  Judge Silver indicated that trigger funds would be 
constitutional if they were tied not to all of the nonparticipating candidate’s 
expenditures but only to outside contributions that candidate received.190  
This alteration, according to the court, “would achieve the anticorruption 
goal recognized by the Supreme Court without burdening a candidate’s 
decision to expend personal funds.”191  It was clear to the court, however, 
that the Act’s trigger funds provision in its current form violated the First 
Amendment.192  Accordingly, it granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs 
and enjoined enforcement of the Act.193 
C.  The Ninth Circuit’s McComish v. Bennett Decision 
1.  Minimal Burden, Intermediate Scrutiny 
The Ninth Circuit, reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo, 
undertook the same bifurcated inquiry as the lower court to determine the 
proper standard of review.194  The Ninth Circuit agreed that the Act’s 
trigger funds provision implicated both contributions and expenditures.195  
As such, it analyzed the Act as “affect[ing] fully protected speech.”196 
With respect to the burden, however, the Ninth Circuit reached a 
different result than the lower court.  It disagreed with that court’s holding 
that the Davis ruling compelled finding a substantial burden.197  The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that Davis was distinguishable because the Millionaire’s 
Amendment “treated candidates running against each other under the same 
regulatory framework differently based on a candidate’s decision to self-
finance.”198  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, unlike the Millionaire’s 
Amendment, the Act’s principal aim was not to “‘level electoral 
opportunities for candidates of different personal wealth.’”199  Thus, 
because the interest was distinguishable, so too was the burden. 
Equally significant to the court’s analysis was the plaintiffs’ failure to 
demonstrate actual chilling of their speech.200  The Ninth Circuit was 
skeptical that any effect on a private candidate’s decision about when to 
spend money constituted a burden of any significance.201  Denouncing the 
 
 190. See id. at *9. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See id. at *10. 
 193. Id. at *13.  However, Judge Silver granted a stay of the injunction to allow Arizona 
to appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Id. 
 194. See McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 520 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 
644 (2010). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 521. 
 198. Id. at 522 (citing Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 738 (2008)). 
 199. Id. (quoting Davis, 554 U.S. at 741).  Rather, the interest was in eliminating 
corruption. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 200. McComish, 611 F.3d at 522-25. 
 201. Id. at 524 (“Many campaign finance regulations, particularly disclosure 
requirements, lead candidates to engage in such strategic behavior, but this does not make 
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trigger funds provision’s potential chilling effect as a “mere metaphysical 
threat[],” the court looked instead for proof that trigger funds had actually 
chilled speech.202  Finding none, it concluded that any burden was “indirect 
or minimal.”203  Unlike the lower court, the Ninth Circuit explicitly 
identified the burden, but called it “merely a theoretical chilling effect on 
donors who might dislike the statutory result of making a contribution or 
candidates who may seek a tactical advantage.”204  This effect, it reasoned, 
was less similar to Davis and far more analogous to Citizens United v. 
FEC205 and Buckley before that.206  The disclosure and disclaimer 
requirements in those cases had some deterrent effect on expenditures but 
stopped short of imposing a ceiling on them.207  Consequently, the Supreme 
Court had applied intermediate scrutiny.208 
2.  The Act Survives Intermediate Scrutiny 
Proceeding to an intermediate scrutiny analysis, the Ninth Circuit first 
identified the state’s interest.  As the lower court had noted, Buckley had 
confirmed the compelling interest in eliminating quid quo pro corruption, as 
well as the appearance of corruption.209  An additional state interest, in 
encouraging participation in public financing schemes, had been recognized 
by several circuits but not by the Supreme Court.210 
Turning to the substantial relation inquiry, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis 
marked a significant departure from that of the lower court.  Whereas that 
court had compared the Act’s effect on nonparticipating, self-financed 
candidates and had found no relation to the recognized anticorruption 
interest, the Ninth Circuit framed the issue differently.211  It found that the 
lower court erred by focusing on the nonparticipating candidate, and by 
construing the purpose of the trigger funds provision in particular as 
reducing the incentive to spend.212  This was misguided because “the Act is 
aimed at reducing corruption among participating candidates.”213  
 
them unconstitutional.”); see also id. at 528 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (“That different laws 
generate different strategies does not make them restrictions on speech.”). But see supra note 
108 and accompanying text (detailing how a choice can be unconstitutionally burdensome). 
 202. McComish, 611 F.3d at 522–23. 
 203. Id. at 523. 
 204. Id. at 525. 
 205. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 206. McComish, 611 F.3d at 525. 
 207. See id. 
 208. Id. (citing Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 
66 (1976) (per curiam))). 
 209. Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–27). 
 210. Id. at 526 (citing Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1553 (8th Cir. 1996); Vote 
Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 39–40 (1st Cir. 1993)). For a detailed discussion of the 
state interest in encouraging participation in public financing, see infra Part III.B.2.c. 
 211. See McComish, 611 F.3d at 526. 
 212. Id. (“The district court misapprehended how the Act functions to reduce corruption.  
It assumed that the Act works by reducing nonparticipating candidates’ incentive to 
fundraise private contributions, thereby reducing the appearance of corruption among 
nonparticipating candidates.”). 
 213. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Accordingly, the question to be answered was whether trigger funds bore a 
substantial relation to reducing corruption among public candidates, not 
among their opponents.214  The Act met that goal, the court held, because 
trigger funds incentivized participation in the public financing program and 
enabled those participants to forgo private contributions—thereby 
insulating them from potential quid pro quo corruption.215  The trigger 
funds provision, the court found, was not designed to chill speech by 
disincentivizing spending; rather, it existed so that Arizona could “allocate 
its funding among races of varying levels of competitiveness without 
having to make qualitative evaluations of which candidates are more 
‘deserving’ of [additional] funding.”216 
In this way, the Ninth Circuit sidestepped a more exacting Davis 
analysis.  Because Arizona had to enroll public candidates to reduce 
corruption, it was justified in matching all of the private candidate’s funds, 
even if those funds were the candidate’s own money.217  The court 
theorized that trigger funds were essential to the public finance system’s 
health and that altering the disbursements would jeopardize that health.218  
It agreed with the lower court that changing them to higher lump sums 
would likely be “prohibitively expensive.”219  However, it disagreed with 
that court’s suggestion to tie trigger funds only to third-party contributions, 
saying that such a change would “substantially diminish the Act’s ability to 
attract participants, thereby undermining its ability to prevent 
corruption.”220  Concluding that the Act was constitutional, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district court.221 
D.  Trigger Funds Post-McComish:  The Race to Election Day 2010 
1.  The Supreme Court Intervenes 
The Ninth Circuit’s stay of the injunction against trigger funds was short-
lived.  On June 8, 2010, the Supreme Court issued an order reinstating the 
injunction.222  Because of the lengthy certiorari process, the Supreme 
 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. (“The more candidates that run with public funding, the smaller the appearance 
among Arizona elected officials of being susceptible to quid pro quo corruption, because 
fewer of those elected officials will have accepted a private campaign contribution and thus 
be viewed as beholden to their campaign contributors or as susceptible to such influence.”). 
 216. Id. at 527. 
 217. Id. at 526 (“If matching funds were not triggered by independent expenditures or 
expenditures from a nonparticipating candidate’s own funds, the Act’s public funding plan 
would not attract participants.”). 
 218. See id. at 527. 
 219. Id.; see McComish v. Brewer, No. CV-08-1550, 2010 WL 2292213, at *8 n.12 (D. 
Ariz. Jan. 20, 2010) (assuming that larger lump-sum disbursements are “not fiscally 
possible”), rev’d sub nom. McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 131 
S. Ct. 644 (2010). 
 220. McComish, 611 F.3d at 527. 
 221. Id. 
 222. McComish v. Bennett, 130 S. Ct. 3408, 3408 (2010) (issuing stay pending timely 
petition for writ of certiorari). 
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Court’s order had the practical effect of eliminating trigger funds for the 
2010 primary and general elections in Arizona.223  Several gubernatorial 
candidates, including the incumbent Governor, Republican Jan Brewer, had 
enrolled in the public program with the expectation of receiving trigger 
funds.224  Not surprisingly, Governor Brewer criticized the Supreme Court 
for “chang[ing] the rules of an election while it is being held,”225 a critique 
that prominent editorial boards shared.226 
2.  The Circuit Courts 
a.  The Second Circuit Strikes Down Trigger Funds in Green Party of 
Connecticut v. Garfield 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was the next appellate 
court to rule on trigger funds’ constitutionality.227  Declaring itself “not 
persuaded” by the Ninth Circuit’s approach in McComish, the court struck 
down certain provisions of Connecticut’s Citizens Elections Program 
(CEP).228  It found that trigger funds (referred to as “the excess expenditure 
provision”) actually constituted a “harsher” penalty than the Millionaire’s 
Amendment of Davis had because the CEP’s provisions amounted to a 
guarantee of additional funds to the plaintiffs’ opponents.229 
After determining the burden, the Second Circuit concluded that the 
excess expenditure provision lacked a compelling state interest to support 
it.230  The court stopped short of explicitly stating, as the District Court of 
 
 223. See Adam Liptak, Justices Block Matching Funds for Candidates in Arizona, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 9, 2010, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/09/
us/politics/09scotus.html. 
 224. Robert Barnes, Arizona Blocked from Subsidizing State Candidates Facing Privately 
Funded Foes, WASH. POST, June 9, 2010, at A5, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/08/AR2010060804816.
html.  
 225. Editorial, Judicial Activism, Unbound, WASH. POST, June 11, 2010, at A18, available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/10/AR2010061004708. 
html (quoting Governor Brewer, who also called the opinion “terribly troubling”).  Governor 
Brewer went on to a decisive victory in November. Jeremy Duda, Brewer Wins Full Term in 
Blowout, AZCAPITOLTIMES.COM (Nov. 3, 2010, 2:25 AM), http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/
2010/11/03/brewer-wins-full-term-in-blowout/. 
 226. See, e.g., Editorial, Judicial Activism, Unbound, supra note 225; Editorial, Keeping 
Politics Safe for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2010, at A24, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/09/opinion/09wed1.html (calling the order a “burst of 
judicial activism” and concluding that “[u]nless the court veers from its determined path, 
there will be no limit to the power of a big bankbook on politics”). 
 227. Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 213, 218 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 
(U.S. Dec. 9, 2010) (No. 10-795). 
 228. Id. at 245 & n.19 (“We are not persuaded by the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, which, we 
note, has been stayed by the Supreme Court pending a petition for a writ of certiorari.”). 
 229. Id. at 244–45 (contrasting this guarantee to the Millionaire’s Amendment in Davis, 
in which “there was some possibility that the non-self-financed candidate . . . would be 
unable to raise additional money under the relaxed restrictions”); see also Scott v. Roberts, 
612 F.3d 1279, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Here, it’s not just a potential dollar.  It’s a certain 
dollar.” (internal quotation omitted)). 
 230. Green Party, 616 F.3d at 245. 
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Arizona had, that trigger funds actually undermined the anticorruption 
interest.231  Rather, it simply held that the anticorruption interest could not 
justify the burden on expenditures.232 
The Second Circuit’s approach departed from that of the Ninth Circuit in 
another important respect.  The Ninth Circuit had relied in large measure on 
the factual record, looking for actual evidence of chilled speech.233  Finding 
none, it scoffed at allegations of the provision’s potential chilling effect as 
“mere metaphysical threats.”234  In contrast, the Second Circuit’s analysis 
was overwhelmingly hypothetical and did not rely on any evidence of an 
actual burden in striking the provision down as violative of the First 
Amendment.235 
b.  The Eleventh Circuit Enjoins Trigger Funds in Scott v. Roberts 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also enjoined the 
disbursal of trigger funds in the middle of the 2010 election cycle.236  Rick 
Scott, a wealthy candidate for the Republican Party’s nomination for 
Florida Governor, brought the constitutional challenge to the Florida 
Election Campaign Financing Act (FECFA).237  FECFA operates 
differently from many public funding statutes in that its “excess spending 
subsidy”238 provision does not include independent expenditures in its 
calculus of trigger funds.239  Nor does FECFA prohibit private fundraising 
by ostensibly public candidates.240 
As his campaign spending approached Florida’s trigger amount, Scott 
had asked the lower court to declare trigger funds unconstitutional under 
Davis.241  He argued that FECFA’s excess spending subsidy was an 
 
 231. See McComish v. Brewer, No. CV-08-1550, 2010 WL 2292213, at *9 (D. Ariz. Jan. 
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“‘reliance on personal funds reduces the threat of corruption’ and ‘discouraging use of 
personal funds disserves the anticorruption interest’” (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 
740-41 (2008), rev’d sub nom. McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 
131 S. Ct. 644 (2010))).  However, the Second Circuit’s citations to the same section of 
Davis suggest that its analysis was similar to that of the District Court of Arizona. See Green 
Party, 616 F.3d at 245 (citing Davis, 554 U.S. at 740–41). 
 232. Green Party, 616 F.3d at 245, 246. 
 233. See McComish, 611 F.3d at 522–25. 
 234. Id. at 522. 
 235. See Green Party, 616 F.3d at 243 (“Consider, for instance, a race for Congress 
between Candidate A and Candidate B.”). Cf. McComish, 611 F.3d at 522–23 (finding that 
any burden is contingent on “the extent that Plaintiffs have proven that the specter of 
matching funds has actually chilled or deterred them from accepting campaign contributions 
or making expenditures”). 
 236. See Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 237. Id. at 1281. 
 238. Id. 
 239. See id. at 1284 (noting that Florida allows all candidates, “whether participating or 
not,” to raise up to $500 from contributors (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.011(18)(c) (West 
2008))); cf. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-952(C)(1) (2006) (counting independent 
expenditures for the purposes of disbursing trigger funds). 
 240. Scott, 612 F.3d at 1293 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.08(1)(a)); cf. ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 16-941(A)(1) (prohibiting contributions with very limited exceptions). 
 241. See Scott, 612 F.3d at 1281. 
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unjustified, severe burden on his First Amendment rights and testified that 
it had caused him to drastically curtail his campaign spending.242  He also 
argued that he was entitled to relief because of the Supreme Court’s stay of 
the Ninth Circuit’s McComish decision.243 
The defendants countered with an argument similar to the Ninth Circuit’s 
McComish reasoning.  They claimed that the excess spending subsidy 
encouraged participation in public financing, “which in turn prevents 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.”244  The district court agreed 
and held that Florida’s compelling anticorruption interest justified the 
excess spending subsidy.245  Accordingly, it concluded that Scott was 
unlikely to win on the merits at trial and denied his motion for a preliminary 
injunction.246 
On emergency appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court and 
enjoined the excess spending subsidy.247  It first agreed with Scott, the 
lower court, and the Second Circuit that trigger funds actually constitute a 
“harsher” penalty on speech than had the Millionaire’s Amendment in 
Davis.248  The court did not reject outright the defendant’s claim that trigger 
funds are constitutional because they encourage participation in an 
anticorruption regime.  Rather, the court did not reach the claim because it 
found that the defendants had failed to show that FECFA prevents 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.249  Moreover, the court held that 
Scott would likely succeed in showing that trigger funds are not the least 
restrictive means of encouraging participation in public finance.250  
Concluding that Scott would probably succeed on the merits and that his 
motion met the other standards for granting a preliminary injunction, the 
Eleventh Circuit enjoined the release of trigger funds to Scott’s 
opponent.251 
 
 242. See id. at 1281, 1283. 
 243. See id. at 1287 (citing McComish v. Bennett, 130 S. Ct. 3408 (2010)) (reinstating the 
stay of trigger funds’ disbursal). 
 244. See id. at 1292. 
 245. Id. at 1289. 
 246. See id. 
 247. See id. at 1281–82. 
 248. Id. at 1291–92. 
 249. See id. at 1292–93.  As Florida’s public finance system limits only expenditures but 
not contributions, the Eleventh Circuit found that it “appears primarily to advantage 
candidates with little money or who exercise restraint in fundraising. . . . and that purpose is 
constitutionally problematic.” Id. at 1293. 
 250. See id. at 1294 (concluding that Florida could encourage participation in public 
finance in a variety of other, less restrictive ways). 
 251. See id. at 1298.  Scott eventually won the Republican primary, after spending more 
than $50 million, “almost a quarter of what he claims to be his total net worth.” Domenico 
Montanaro, Rick Scott Spent $50 Million on Primary Bid, FIRST READ (Aug. 24, 2010, 6:08 
PM), http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2010/08/24/4962783-rick-scott-spent-50-
million-on-primary-bid.  He ultimately prevailed in a very close general election after 
spending more than $78 million. Simone Baribeau, Florida Republican Scott Elected 
Governor After Record Spending, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 3, 2010, 3:21 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-03/florida-republican-scott-elected-governor-
after-record-spending.html. 
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c.  The First Circuit Allows Trigger Funds in Respect Maine PAC v. 
McKee 
Most recently, however, the First Circuit denied an emergency appeal to 
enjoin trigger funds.252  The district court had declared itself bound by the 
First Circuit’s 2000 Daggett decision, which upheld trigger funds,253 and 
had held that no recent jurisprudence “cast Daggett into disrepute or 
otherwise reflect an overruling of Daggett.”254  Because of this, the lower 
court had concluded that the plaintiffs had no chance of success on the 
merits and had denied the motion for a temporary restraining order.255 
With less than one month before the November elections, the First 
Circuit heard the plaintiffs’ emergency motion for injunctive relief.256  The 
court found that the root of the claim involved material factual disputes, 
rendering it impossible to predict the likelihood of success on the merits.257  
The First Circuit also found that judicial invalidation of significant state 
election laws in the last weeks of the election cycle would harm the public 
interest, and that this last-minute “‘emergency’ [was] largely one of [the 
appellants’] own making.”258  Accordingly, it denied the emergency 
motion.259 
The appellants next sought injunctive relief from Justice Stephen Breyer, 
the Circuit Justice for the First Circuit.260  He denied relief on October 13, 
2010 without asking for a reply from Maine.261  The next week, the 
appellants re-filed their plea with Justice Kennedy.262  Justice Kennedy 
asked the state to respond, and after it had done so, he referred the matter to 
the entire Court.263  However, the Supreme Court denied the request on 
 
 252. See Respect Me. PAC v. McKee, 622 F.3d 13, 14–15 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 253. For a greater discussion of the Daggett decision, see supra Part I.C.2. 
 254. Cushing v. McKee, No. 1:10-CV-330, 2010 WL 3699504, at *7 (D. Me. Sept. 15, 
2010), emergency appeal denied, sub nom. Respect Me. PAC v. McKee, 622 F.3d  13, 14–
15 (1st Cir. 2010).  The court also explained that Davis was factually distinguishable from 
the case before it. Id. at *7 n.17. 
 255. Id. at *8. 
 256. See Respect Me. PAC, 622 F.3d at 14. 
 257. Id. at 15.  Specifically, the court mentioned the differences between Maine’s trigger 
funds provision and other states’ regimes, as well as other potential factual issues including 
“the strength of the state’s legitimate interest in combating election fraud and the appearance 
of fraud, the degree of burden created by the challenged laws, and the narrow tailoring of 
these laws to achieve the state’s anticorruption interests.” Id. 
 258. Id. at 16 (noting that the appellants intentionally chose to delay their filing, despite 
the impending election date and the fact that “the case law on which they rely is not new”). 
But see Andre Cushing, Guest Column, Should Taxpayers’ Money Still Fund Election 
Campaigns?, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Nov. 5, 2010), 
http://www.bangordailynews.com/story/Opinion/Should-taxpayers-money-still-fund-
election-campaigns,158053 (arguing that the challenge was promptly brought on the basis of 
the newly-decided circuit court cases). 
 259. Respect Me. PAC, 622 F.3d at 16. 
 260. Lyle Denniston, Maine Election Plea Denied, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 13, 2010, 1:58 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/10/maine-election-plea-denied/. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Lyle Denniston, Update:  Maine Election Challenge Fails, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 22, 
2010, 4:18 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/10/maine-defends-campaign-law/. 
 263. Id. 
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October 22.264  The Court noted that while it had intervened in McComish, 
there the appellants had requested a stay of a full appeals court decision 
rather than “an injunction against enforcement of a presumptively 
constitutional state legislative act.”265  This was significant, the Court 
found, because “unlike a stay, an injunction ‘does not simply suspend 
judicial alteration of the status quo but grants judicial intervention that has 
been withheld by lower courts.’”266  The Supreme Court was unwilling to 
so intervene less than two weeks before the election.267  However, its order 
stated that Justice Scalia and Justice Alito would have enjoined the trigger 
funds provisions,268 signaling how these two Justices might rule on the 
merits of the McComish case.  Finally, the First Circuit affirmed its denial 
of the injunction on October 29, and trigger funds were disbursed as 
scheduled.269 
III.  PUTTING TRIGGER FUNDS IN CONTEXT 
As detailed in Part II, circuit courts have split regarding whether public 
finance regimes with trigger provisions are constitutional in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. FEC.  Part III first asserts that no 
court has yet engaged in a full, considered analysis of both the state’s 
interest in trigger funds and the burden imposed by them.  It continues by 
offering a contextual approach for this analysis that, while novel in name, is 
consistent with established jurisprudence. 
When determining the constitutionality of public finance regimes, courts 
must engage in a comprehensive analysis that includes full consideration of 
both the burden on speech and the state’s interest in preventing corruption 
and the appearance of corruption.  However, courts should not glibly rip 
each individual provision from its context and shove it under the 
anticorruption microscope.  Public finance legislation is often 
comprehensive and interconnected, consisting of smaller provisions that 
cannot function independently of one another.270  Therefore, in order to 
decide whether a particular provision of a public finance statute is justified 
by the state’s interest in preventing corruption, courts must first ascertain 
the provision’s purpose within the context of the larger initiative.  Where 
the provision does not help advance the anticorruption strategy of the larger 
 
 264. Respect Me. PAC v. McKee, 131 S. Ct. 445 (2010) (denying injunction). 
 265. Id. at 445. 
 266. Id. (quoting Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy, Inc. v. NRC, 479 U.S. 1312, 
1313 (1986) (Scalia, J., in chambers)). 
 267. See id. (noting “the difficulties in fashioning relief so close to the election”). 
 268. Id. 
 269. See Respect Me. PAC v. McKee, 624 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2010) (affirming denial of 
preliminary injunctive relief).  The only named plaintiff who was an elected official, 
Representative Andre E. Cushing, III, nevertheless handily won his bid for reelection. See 
Maine Election Results, http://www.bangordailynews.com/electionresults.html (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2011).  
 270. See infra note 325 and accompanying text (noting that several Supreme Court 
Justices have cautioned against eliminating individual pieces of comprehensive campaign 
finance legislation). 
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package, or where the entire public finance regime fails to prevent 
corruption, courts should strike it down.  However, where a provision 
implements or facilitates the public finance regime’s other sections, and 
thereby serves the larger legislative package’s anticorruption goals (albeit 
indirectly), as trigger funds usually do, courts should uphold the provision. 
A.  Davis Revisited:  Is It Distinguishable? 
Lower courts have struggled with the question of whether trigger funds 
can be upheld in light of Davis since that opinion’s publication in 2008.271  
It is a difficult question, but one that must be addressed in a comprehensive 
way—something that has been missing from each post-Davis decision on 
trigger funds.  This analysis must include a consideration of the Supreme 
Court’s findings as to the burdensome effects of the Millionaire’s 
Amendment and the state’s interest behind it.  Section A asserts that the 
Ninth Circuit incorrectly distinguished the burden found in Davis from that 
imposed by trigger funds.  However, such similarity between the burdens 
should not end the constitutional inquiry.  This section concludes that the 
state interest behind the Millionaire’s Amendment in Davis is 
distinguishable from the interest in trigger funds. 
1.  The Davis Burden Is Not Distinguishable 
With regard to the burden, it is clear that Davis is not distinguishable and 
demands a similar analysis of the burden imposed by trigger funds.  As the 
First Circuit remarked in Daggett, the First Amendment confers “no right to 
speak free from response.”272  But a speaker could arguably concede that 
point while nevertheless objecting to the government bankrolling his 
opponent’s response.  By enabling such robust state action, a trigger funds 
provision imposes a greater burden than the Millionaire’s Amendment; 
rather than just opening up the possibility that the burdened candidate’s 
opponent will get additional funds, it actually bestows those funds directly 
on the opponent.  It is this aspect of trigger funds that the lower court in 
Brewer,273 the Second Circuit in Green Party,274 and the Eleventh Circuit 
in Scott275 ultimately found dispositive:  if the mere possibility of additional 
funds is substantially burdensome, surely a guarantee of cash is even more 
so. 
 
 271. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008), struck down the Millionaire’s Amendment to 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, which relaxed fundraising limitations for 
opponents of self-financed candidates, as unconstitutionally burdensome on the self-financed 
candidate’s First Amendment rights. See supra Part I.D. 
 272. Daggett v. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics, 205 F.3d 445, 464 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 14 (1986)).  For a detailed 
discussion of the First Circuit’s Daggett opinion, see supra Part I.C.2. 
 273. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (citing the same finding by the District of 
Arizona); see also supra Part II.B. 
 274. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (contrasting this guarantee to the 
Millionaire’s Amendment of Davis). 
 275. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (citing the same finding by the Eleventh 
Circuit). 
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In McComish, the Ninth Circuit found that, unlike in Davis, the burden 
on the plaintiffs was minimal rather than substantial.276  However, the 
reasoning that led to this conclusion is fatally flawed.  First, the Ninth 
Circuit was wrong to conclude that the burden is minimal simply because 
the plaintiffs chose to spend the money anyway.  Such a conclusion 
presumes that the only evidence of a burden would be actually chilled 
speech.  But, as in Davis, the burden inquiry does not begin and end with 
the question of whether speech was actually chilled.277  Indeed, the Davis 
court recognized that the burden can be “the activation of a scheme” hostile 
to the plaintiff, such as the triggering of additional funds.278  In other words, 
the provision burdens the plaintiff whether or not he chooses to speak. 
The Ninth Circuit seemed to justify its finding of a minimal burden—and 
consequent decision to apply intermediate scrutiny—by pointing to 
Buckley, which subjected disclosure requirements to intermediate scrutiny 
because they “impose[d] no ceiling on campaign-related activities.”279  
Davis precludes this reasoning, however, since that decision struck down a 
law that also stopped short of imposing a hard cap on spending.280  It did 
not matter to the Davis majority that the wealthy candidate remained free to 
spend as much money as he saw fit.  This option did not eliminate the 
burden, which was significant enough to warrant strict scrutiny.281 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s comparison of the Act’s burden to the 
burden imposed by disclosure and disclaimer requirements282 is 
fundamentally untenable.  Disclosure to the FEC really only deters those 
donors who do not want their contributions to be publicized.283  It cannot be 
denied that this burden, the possibility of getting fewer contributions, is 
considerably smaller than the certainty of one’s opponent receiving trigger 
funds.284  For the Ninth Circuit to pretend otherwise seems little more than 
an attempt to shift the focus away from that more obvious, ominous 
precedent:  Davis. 
Perhaps the reason that some courts, including the Second Circuit, have 
found the Ninth Circuit’s McComish decision so unpersuasive is because it 
doggedly strained to distinguish the burden imposed by the Act from that in 
 
 276. For a discussion of this finding, see supra Part II.C.1. (applying intermediate 
scrutiny to trigger funds because they imposed no limit on expenditures). 
 277. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (asserting that state action may be 
substantially burdensome despite not having actually chilled speech). 
 278. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 740 (2008). 
 279. McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 525 (9th Cir.) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam)), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 644 (2010). 
 280. See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text (finding a substantial burden on 
speech rights despite the lack of such a ceiling). 
 281. For a brief discussion of the relationship between strict scrutiny and Buckley’s 
“exacting scrutiny,” see supra note 42 and infra note 309 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (comparing trigger funds to the 
disclosure and disclaimer requirements of other statutes). 
 283. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68 (“[P]ublic disclosure of contributions to candidates and 
political parties will deter some individuals who otherwise might contribute.”). 
 284. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 915 (2010) (“[D]isclosure is a less 
restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations of speech.” (citing FEC v. Mass. 
Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986))). 
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Davis’s Millionaire’s Amendment.  The truth is that the burdens in 
McComish and Davis are too similar to ignore.  Davis ended the debate 
about whether the First Amendment prioritizes maximizing the amount of 
speech or only protects speakers from potential, state-imposed adverse 
effects of their speech.  Justice Alito’s majority opinion answered 
unequivocally that the First Amendment’s duty is the latter.285  No longer 
may courts determine, as the First and Fourth Circuits once did, that trigger 
funds provisions constitute no burden on speech because they increase the 
amount of aggregate speech.286  Nor was the Ninth Circuit justified when it 
held that trigger funds only constitute a minimal or theoretical burden on 
speech.287  The burden is there, Davis proclaimed, and it is substantial.288  
But this answers only half of the question of whether Davis is 
distinguishable. 
2.  The Davis Interest Is Distinguishable 
Because the government could not show any anticorruption interest in the 
Millionaire’s Amendment, the Davis Court concluded that its substantial 
burden on protected speech was not justified.289  As will be discussed 
below, trigger funds have a much stronger claim to the anticorruption 
interest than the Millionaire’s Amendment.  For this and the following 
reasons, Davis is distinguishable on the interest analysis, and lower courts 
evaluating trigger funds must not look to Davis in deciding whether trigger 
funds provisions justify the severe burden they impose on speech. 
Most obviously, Davis and the Millionaire’s Amendment had nothing to 
do with public funding.  Indeed, when asked at oral argument what a less 
restrictive alternative to the Millionaire’s Amendment would be, Davis’s 
counsel suggested public finance.290  Similarly, the Millionaire’s 
Amendment did nothing to fight corruption because it did not incentivize 
public funding or any other anticorruption choice by candidates.  In fact, it 
arguably hindered the anticorruption interest by lifting the ceiling on 
potentially corrupting contributions.291  Rather, its stated interest was in 
“level[ing] electoral opportunities,”292 and was presented to the Court as a 
legislative response to a specific, legislatively and judicially created 
 
 285. See supra notes 125–29 and accompanying text (describing how the Court struck 
down the Millionaire’s Amendment, which arguably increased the aggregate amount of 
speech). 
 286. For a discussion of this finding, see supra Part I.C.2. 
 287. For a discussion of this finding, see supra Part II.C.1. 
 288. See supra notes 110, 182, and accompanying text. 
 289. For a discussion of this finding, see supra Part I.D.1. 
 290. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–12, Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (No. 
07-320), 2008 WL 1803646.  However, plaintiff’s counsel stopped short of endorsing a 
hypothetical scheme put forth by Justice Scalia that resembled a trigger funds provision. Id. 
at 12. 
 291. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (noting that outside contributions, not 
self-financing, are potentially corrupting under Buckley). 
 292. Davis, 554 U.S. at 741. 
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problem—the unfair advantage that contribution limits bestowed upon 
affluent candidates post-Buckley.293 
Opponents of trigger funds are quick to link the scheme to the forbidden 
interest in leveling electoral opportunities, and argue that they may not 
survive if that interest is not legitimate.294  Before Davis, supporters of 
trigger funds had also advanced the “leveling” conception of the scheme.295  
Publicizing the equalizing effect of trigger funds made sense at the time 
because prior to the replacements of Chief Justice William Rehnquist and 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor with Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice 
Alito, respectively, the Court had embraced a broader view of the 
anticorruption interest that justified more robust regulation of the amounts 
and sources of campaign money.296 
The conception of trigger funds as leveling device resonates intuitively as 
well.  It is easy to view trigger funds as having something of a neutralizing 
effect among the electioneering of competing candidates.  Tying the payday 
of one candidate directly to the expenditures of his opponent would seem to 
implicate the same burdensome choice that the Davis Court found so 
loathsome.297  Whether this translates to intent by the drafters is dubious, 
however, especially since most trigger provisions cap the maximum amount 
of additional funds and thereby limit the “leveling” effect.298 
More importantly, leveling electoral opportunities is not the end unto 
itself.  Rather, the fact that trigger funds tend to promote a competitive race 
is a logical consequence of making the larger public finance regime 
attractive to potential participants.  Indeed, it seems likely that any public 
scheme worth enrolling in would have at least some equalizing effect, 
making the “leveling” analysis something of a dead end when applied to 
public finance.  While trigger funds do level the playing field somewhat, 
this is a collateral effect.  The analysis cannot stop there. 
Because trigger funds have at least a colorable claim to the anticorruption 
rationale, the Davis decision is not instructive on how this interest might be 
met.  Summarily, it is not enough to say, as the Ninth Circuit tried to, that 
 
 293. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 294. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text. 
 295. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-940 (2006) (finding that candidates’ need to 
fundraise has decreased the quality of elections, and describing the Act’s intent to reduce the 
influence of money in campaigns); Weine, supra note 34, at 224 (“Triggers are complex 
mechanisms that are designed to achieve an objective that is relatively straightforward:  
leveling the financial playing field among candidates.”). 
 296. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990) 
(upholding a law aimed at “a different type of corruption in the political arena:  the corrosive 
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth”).  For a comprehensive analysis of 
the Court’s shifting ideas about what types of campaign finance regulations are justifiable, 
see Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley:  The New Campaign Finance 
Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 41 
(2004), which argues that a majority of the Rehnquist Court came to accept, at least 
intermittently, a “barometer equality” rationale for certain campaign finance laws. 
 297. See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text (describing the court’s denunciation 
of adverse regulations activating as a consequence of choosing to self-finance).  
 298. See, e.g., supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text (noting that Arizona’s trigger 
funds provision caps the level of additional funding at three times the initial grant). 
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the burdens in McComish and Davis are dissimilar.299  They are not.  Nor is 
it enough to say, as the Second Circuit did, that because the burdens are 
similar, the outcome must be the same.300  A more rigorous analysis of the 
interest is necessary. 
B.  The Interest Analysis:  A Contextual Approach 
Courts that strike down trigger funds often make the same error:  they 
conceive of trigger funds as a punitive measure.301  Although this mistake 
ultimately dooms the analysis, it is easy to make.  Trigger funds burden the 
speech of nonparticipating candidates, so it is not much of a leap to assume 
they must have been designed to do just that—to reduce corruption by 
disincentivizing private contributions or expenditures by nonparticipating 
candidates. 
However, this conception of trigger provisions misses their point.302  It 
obscures the primary justification for trigger funds provisions:  they 
implement the public system by providing enough support to draw 
participants without unnecessarily emptying the public coffers.303  
Candidates will be unlikely to enroll in public funding if doing so causes 
them to incur a serious spending disadvantage.304  Trigger funds schemes 
are an efficient way to provide this assurance since they give the public 
candidate only enough funding to be viable, but no more.305 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion, although problematic in some important 
respects, is commendable for its precision in analyzing the interest of 
Arizona’s Act.  The court correctly found that the Act, and its trigger funds 
provision in particular, was not written to have a deleterious effect on 
candidates who had no desire to participate.306  Rather, it was concerned 
with winning over candidates thanks to the program’s guarantee of a fairer 
fight.307  As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, the rationale behind tying the 
disbursements to the private opponent was not to make the opponent think 
 
 299. See supra notes 197–99 and accompanying text (detailing the Ninth Circuit’s 
findings in McComish). 
 300. For a discussion of the Second Circuit’s Green Party decision, see supra Part 
II.D.2.a. 
 301. See, e.g., supra note 212 and accompanying text (discussing the District of Arizona’s 
assessment of the function of trigger funds). 
 302. See McComish v. Brewer, No. CV-08-1550, 2010 WL 2292213, at *9 n.17 (D. Ariz. 
Jan. 20, 2010) (“[Arizona] stressed that ‘[t]he point of matching funds is not to deter self-
financing,’ it is ‘to incentivize participation in the public financing system thereby reducing 
the risk of corruption.’” (quoting oral argument)), rev’d sub nom. McComish v. Bennett, 611 
F.3d 510 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 644 (2010). 
 303. For a greater discussion of this topic, see supra Parts I.A and II.C.2. 
 304. Weine, supra note 34, at 223 (“No candidate will unilaterally disarm, reformers 
argue, when faced with potentially unlimited expenditures by opposing candidates or their 
allies.”). 
 305. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
 306. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (finding that the drafters’ focus was on 
the participating candidate, rather than on her nonparticipating opponent). 
 307. See supra notes 213–15 and accompanying text. 
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twice about making expenditures.  It was to keep the entire Act solvent by 
allocating resources only as necessary.308 
Just because disbursing public money in the form of trigger funds is 
efficient—or even unavoidable—does not make it constitutional, however.  
Courts must still determine whether public finance regimes with trigger 
funds provisions serve the anticorruption interest.309  The next section 
addresses how courts should conduct this analysis. 
1.  Defining the Anticorruption Interest:  Echoes of Buckley 
In the past two decades, the Supreme Court has not always spoken 
consistently about the state interest necessary to justify campaign finance 
regulations that inhibit political speech.310  When the Court has upheld such 
regulations, it has done so by referring to the anticorruption interest.311  
What corruption encompasses has itself been something of a moving 
target.312  Recently, however, the Court has reaffirmed the narrow reading 
 
 308. See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text (noting that the incremental nature 
of trigger funds is more efficient than disbursing public funding in large lump sums). 
 309. Some lower courts have imposed the burden on states to show that their solution not 
only prevents corruption but also is the least restrictive alternative. See, e.g., supra notes 
188, 250, and accompanying text.  However, it is not clear that Supreme Court campaign 
finance jurisprudence supports such a burden.  The Court has insisted on the least restrictive 
alternative in evaluating content-based regulations unrelated to campaign finance. See, e.g., 
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).  However, Buckley 
asked only whether a provision was “reasonable and minimally restrictive” and upheld, out 
of deference to the legislature, provisions of the public financing tax check-off even where 
there were arguably less restrictive alternatives. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 82, 92 n.125 
(1976) (per curiam).  Moreover, members of the Court have cautioned against mechanically 
applying “least restrictive means” to “the difficult constitutional problem that campaign 
finance statutes pose.” Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, 
J., concurring) (citing Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 233–34 
(1989) (Stevens, J., concurring); Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 
U.S. 173, 188–89 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96 
(1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 310. See infra note 312 (discussing the different approaches to scrutinizing the 
anticorruption interest in campaign finance statutes).   
 311. To be exact, the Court has spoken of preventing “corruption and the appearance of 
corruption.” See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 33 (emphasis added); Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-
Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 394–95 (2009) (discussing courts’ concern 
about the electorate’s perceptions of political corruption).  However, there is apparently no 
distinct analysis for whether a statute furthers the state’s interest in preventing the 
appearance of corruption.  Some scholars have argued that “the Court’s invocation of this 
novel state interest has less to do with the importance of removing unsavory appearances and 
more to do with the difficulty of proving actual corruption.” Nathaniel Persily & Kelli 
Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance:  When Public Opinion 
Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 121 (2004).  There is no such proof 
problem in Arizona, however, where evidence of actual corruption was plentiful when 
Arizona passed its public finance regime. See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text 
(discussing Arizona’s political scandals).  To the extent that the interest in preventing the 
appearance of corruption is rooted in concern for “confidence in the system of representative 
[g]overnment,” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (citation omitted), it may be significant that 
Arizona’s public finance reforms were passed directly by the voters. See supra note 134 and 
accompanying text (noting that the Act was passed by ballot initiative). 
 312. For an explanation of the different conceptions of corruption in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, see Teachout, supra note 311, at 383–97. See generally Hasen, supra note 
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of anticorruption, first articulated in Buckley,313 that the only corruption 
worth combating is quid pro quo.314  This reading of corruption has spelled 
doom for legislative attempts to regulate expenditures because of Buckley’s 
declaration that expenditures are not corrupting.315 
Some lower courts have condemned trigger funds to a similar fate.  They 
have reasoned that, since expenditures do not corrupt like contributions, the 
burden that trigger funds impose on expenditures cannot be justified.  This 
rationale played a critical role in the Brewer decision of the District of 
Arizona316 and also found support in the Second Circuit’s Green Party 
opinion.317 
Like the narrow reading of corruption itself, this “piecemeal approach to 
statutory construction” of campaign finance laws also traces its lineage back 
to Buckley.318  That decision went through FECA line by line; scrutinizing 
each provision against the First Amendment and the anticorruption interest, 
the Buckley Court upheld certain provisions but struck many others.319 
Whatever the Buckley method’s merits as a dogmatically pure exercise, 
few would defend the decision as having made a positive impact on 
campaign finance law.320  Pro-regulation scholars point to the Buckley 
decision as one that “took a congressional program designed to minimize 
the impact of wealth on campaigns and turned it into an engine for the 
glorification of money.”321  Similarly, those who would deregulate 
campaign finance feel that Buckley is “deeply flawed”322 and should be 
 
296; Dennis F. Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption:  Making Campaigns Safe for 
Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036 (2005). 
 313. 424 U.S. at 26–28; see Teachout, supra note 311, at 385 (noting that Buckley 
“introduce[d] the idea that corruption and quid pro quo might be interchangeable”). 
 314. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 908–09 (2010). But see Teachout, supra 
note 311, at 388–91 (arguing that Buckley has been misconstrued as holding that quid pro 
quo is the only type of corruption worth fighting). 
 315. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908 (“Limits on independent expenditures . . . have a 
chilling effect extending well beyond the Government’s interest in preventing quid pro quo 
corruption.”); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55 (“No governmental interest that has been suggested is 
sufficient to justify the restriction on the quantity of political expression imposed by 
[FECA’s] campaign expenditure limitations.”); see also supra Part I.B. 
 316. See supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra notes 230–32 and accompanying text. 
 318. Stephen Kanter, The Griswold Diagrams:  Toward a Unified Theory of 
Constitutional Rights, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 635 n.52 (2006). 
 319. For a discussion of Buckley, see supra Part I.B. 
 320. See Esenberg, supra note 101, at 292 (“Buckley’s distinction between expenditures 
and contributions has been criticized by opponents and advocates of regulation alike.”). 
 321. BURT NEUBORNE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM & THE CONSTITUTION:  A CRITICAL 
LOOK AT BUCKLEY V. VALEO 18 (Brennan Center for Justice Campaign Finance Reform Series 
1997) (framing the decision’s flaws economically:  “[T]he Buckley Court limited supply 
(contributions), while leaving demand (expenditures) free to grow without limit.”); see also 
ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 19, at 337 (“The [Buckley] result is an odd regulatory 
misalignment between the encumbered ability to raise money and the unfettered capacity to 
spend it.”). 
 322. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 640 (1996) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).  Justice Thomas has argued 
that the distinction between contributions and expenditures “lacks constitutional 
significance” and would subject both to the most exacting scrutiny. Id. at 636, 640–41. 
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discarded.323  As Chief Justice Warren Burger (no fan of comprehensive 
election reform)324 remarked at the time:  “By dissecting [the legislation] 
bit by bit, and casting off vital parts, the Court fails to recognize that the 
whole of this Act is greater than the sum of its parts.”325  Ideology or 
judicial philosophy aside, it is clear that the Buckley Court’s approach of 
striking some provisions and upholding others caused “campaign finance 
regulation [to] survive[] in a form that no legislature ever voted to create 
and, one may surmise, no legislature would ever have voted to create.”326  
At the very least, it may be charitably stated that courts should not rush to 
apply the Buckley method to comprehensive public finance legislation. 
2.  A New Way Forward:  Defining the Contextual Approach 
This section describes the contextual approach and its application.  It 
then explains how, under this approach, Arizona’s Act does not violate the 
First Amendment.  This section concludes with an explanation of how the 
contextual approach is consistent with established jurisprudence. 
When it comes to public finance regimes, the Supreme Court should 
embrace a more nuanced analysis.  Statutes like Arizona’s Citizens Clean 
Elections Act are complicated pieces of legislation that contain many 
interlocking provisions.  Each provision may be as important as the next, or 
one may lay the groundwork for the others.  Either way, the regime may be 
severely compromised if one section is divorced from the larger package. 
However, it would be futile to ask courts to make consistent, qualitative 
judgments about the usefulness of individual provisions.  It would be even 
more futile for drafters of legislation to guess whether courts would find a 
particular provision sufficiently important and therefore worthy of a more 
contextual analysis.  Accordingly, courts should not endeavor to determine 
how crucial a certain provision is to the larger public finance regime.  
Rather, the inquiry should be, as the Eleventh Circuit put it, whether the 
provision “furthers the anticorruption interest by encouraging participation 
in the public campaign financing system of [the state], which in turn 
prevents corruption or the appearance of corruption.”327  Given that the 
inquiry is built upon the need to encourage participation, this approach 
should be confined to voluntary public finance regimes. 
 
 323. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 408–09 (2000) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (“Buckley has not worked.”). 
 324. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 235 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (calling public financing “an impermissible intrusion by the 
Government into the traditionally private political process”). 
 325. Id.; see also Nixon, 528 U.S. at 408 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Our First 
Amendment principles surely tell us that an interest thought to be the compelling reason for 
enacting a law is cast into grave doubt when a worse evil surfaces in the law’s actual 
operation.”); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 518 (1985) 
(White, J., dissenting) (excoriating the majority’s decision to “[strike] down one portion of 
an integrated and comprehensive statute”). 
 326. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 19, at 338. 
 327. Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1292 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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If courts do not acknowledge context and instead isolate certain sections 
of public finance laws—in the case of McComish, the trigger provision—
from the rest of the legislation, they will set up such regimes to fail every 
time.  But if courts admit that trigger funds are the driving force by which 
comprehensive public finance legislation fulfills its anticorruption mission, 
they will likely conclude that the benefits of clean elections outweigh 
trigger funds’ substantial burden on speech rights. 
Because this approach is fact specific, it need not amount to a rubber 
stamp.  If a court is not convinced that a public finance program prevents 
corruption,328 the contextual approach will not shield any of its individual 
provisions.  Similarly, if a particular provision adds little to a public finance 
regime’s effectiveness,329 there is no reason for the court to uphold it. 
a.  Applying the Contextual Approach to Arizona’s Act 
Under this approach, Arizona’s Act should survive exacting scrutiny.  Its 
trigger funds provision is the foundation for the state’s larger public finance 
system because it simultaneously facilitates two benchmarks without which 
the regime could not function:  participation and efficiency.  Candidates 
interested in “running clean” have little incentive to do so without a 
mechanism to protect their speech from being drowned out entirely.330  To 
accomplish that, however, the mechanism must disburse as few funds as 
necessary so as not to bankrupt the regime.331  Trigger funds have achieved 
unparalleled success at negotiating these two mandates, which are otherwise 
fundamentally at odds.  In Arizona, trigger funds have allowed the Act to 
guard candidates for public office against quid pro quo corruption by 
enrolling them in its voluntary, no-contribution regime.  Taken as a whole, 
the Act clearly meets even the Supreme Court’s own, narrow definition of 
anticorruption by enrolling candidates in public financing where they 
cannot be ensnared by quid pro quo corruption. 
b.  This Approach Is Consistent with Davis 
Many proponents of campaign finance reform claim that the Supreme 
Court decided Davis incorrectly.332  A full consideration of that claim is 
beyond the scope of this Note.  Rather, this section asserts that, irrespective 
of the wisdom of the Davis opinion, its rationale can be squared with the 
contextual approach to evaluating public finance regimes. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Davis illustrates why the contextual 
approach should be limited to public finance statutes, and why the approach 
 
 328. See supra note 249 and accompanying text (discussing a case that enjoined a trigger 
provision because of doubts about the larger public finance regime). 
 329. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing a case that struck down a 
trigger provision as unnecessary to bolster the public finance system, which already enjoyed 
near-unanimous participation). 
 330. See supra note 304 and accompanying text. 
 331. See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text. 
 332. See, e.g., supra notes 120–21, 122, and accompanying text (criticizing Davis). 
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is therefore consistent with that ruling.  Although BCRA furthers the 
anticorruption interest, its Millionaire’s Amendment did not.  It had nothing 
to do with public financing.333  Moreover, unlike trigger funds, it did not 
facilitate the larger legislative package’s anticorruption measures.  It was 
not tasked with encouraging participation, which was mandatory since 
candidates could not opt out of BCRA’s reforms, as they can with public 
finance.334  Nor was it concerned with efficiency or solvency since it had no 
funds to administer.  At most, the Millionaire’s Amendment complemented 
BCRA’s other provisions, which restricted or outlawed various types of 
contributions, by burdening personal expenditures.335  However, this 
attempt to achieve consistency across the regime ignored Buckley, which 
carved out far greater protection for expenditures than for contributions.336  
Because the Millionaire’s Amendment did nothing to help the BCRA 
regime further the anticorruption interest, but merely mitigated some other 
adverse effect of the campaign finance regulations, the Court properly 
scrutinized whether the provision itself served the anticorruption interest. 
c.  The Contextual Approach Is Consistent with That of Several Circuit 
Courts 
This approach is also consistent with that of several circuit courts.  
Perhaps recognizing that every single individual provision in 
comprehensive public finance regimes cannot possibly be shown to prevent 
quid pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof directly, these courts 
have held that such provisions are instead justified by a state interest in 
encouraging participation in the public finance program.  The First Circuit 
was the first court to recognize such a participation interest, finding it to be 
a natural byproduct of Buckley’s public finance imprimatur:  “When, as 
now, the legislature has adopted a public funding alternative, the state 
possesses a valid interest in having candidates accept public 
financing . . . .”337  The Eighth Circuit was next, taking the extra step of 
finding that the state’s interest in encouraging participation was 
compelling.338  The Ninth Circuit adopted these holdings in its McComish 
opinion.339 
 
 333. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (noting that the Millionaire’s 
Amendment did not relate to public financing). 
 334. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (noting that candidates could not opt out 
of BCRA’s provisions). 
 335. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (finding that the Millionaire’s 
Amendment was intended to correct the advantages conferred on self-financing candidates 
by FECA and Buckley). 
 336. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 743 (2008). For an explanation of Buckley, see supra 
Part I.B. 
 337. Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 39 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding that public 
financing programs “‘facilitate communication by candidates with the electorate,’ free 
candidates from the pressures of fundraising, and, relatedly, tend to combat corruption” 
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976) (per curiam))). 
 338. See Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1553 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he State has a 
compelling interest in stimulating candidate participation in its public financing scheme.”) 
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Most recently, the Second Circuit and Eleventh Circuit considered the 
participation interest.340  The Second Circuit concluded that the interest was 
not compelling.341  The Eleventh Circuit did not reach the question of 
whether to recognize the interest because it found that Florida had not yet 
proven that the underlying public financing system furthered the 
anticorruption interest.342 
If the Supreme Court adopts the determinations of these three circuit 
courts and recognizes a compelling state interest in encouraging 
participation in public financing programs, its analysis would be simple.  
The Court could simply find that this interest justifies the severe burden that 
trigger funds impose on speech rights, and uphold Arizona’s Act.343  
However, the Court need not take the rare step of formally recognizing a 
new compelling state interest.  It must only analyze whether the trigger 
funds provision “furthers the anticorruption interest by encouraging 
participation in the public campaign financing system of [the state], which 
in turn prevents corruption or the appearance of corruption.”344  If the 
provision passes this test, the Court should hold that it is constitutional. 
3.  Without the Contextual Approach, Can Trigger Funds Survive? 
If the Supreme Court refuses to adopt the contextual approach or the 
participation interest, and instead analyzes Arizona’s trigger funds 
provision without the context of the Citizens Clean Elections Act, it will 
likely find that trigger funds provisions as they currently exist 
unconstitutionally burden First Amendment protections.  If this happens, 
state public finance regimes across the country will have to be discarded or 
redesigned.  States may choose to do away with trigger funds entirely in 
favor of another delivery mechanism, such as multiplier match.345  Such a 
 
(citing Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 39; Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916, 928 (W.D. Ky. 
1995)). 
 339. McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 526 (9th Cir.) (“Because Buckley held that 
public financing of elections furthers First Amendment values, federal courts have found that 
states may structure them in a manner which will encourage candidate participation in 
them.”), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 644 (2010). 
 340. Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1292 (11th Cir. 2010); Green Party of Conn. v. 
Garfield, 616 F.3d 213, 245 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 9, 2010) (No. 10-
795). 
 341. Green Party, 616 F.3d at 245 (“Davis was clear that a ‘burden . . . on the expenditure 
of personal funds is not justified by any governmental interest in eliminating corruption or 
the perception of corruption.’” (quoting Davis, 554 U.S. at 740)).  However, Davis noted 
only that restricting self-funding itself does not reduce corruption.  This proposition seems 
completely irrelevant to the question at hand:  whether an interest in encouraging 
participation justifies a substantial but indirect burden on expenditures. 
 342. Scott, 612 F.3d at 1292.  For a discussion of this finding by the court, see supra note 
249 and accompanying text. 
 343. Admittedly, such a perfunctory analysis does not address the question of whether a 
state can go too far in furthering the participation interest.  The difficulties inherent in 
drawing such a line may weigh against the adoption of this interest by the Supreme Court. 
 344. Scott, 612 F.3d at 1292. 
 345. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing New York City’s multiplier 
match program). 
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mechanism would have to avoid any association with opposition spending, 
thus lacking the efficiency of trigger funds, which disburse only as much 
money as needed in the context of a particular electoral contest.346  Other 
mechanisms are also vulnerable to the criticism that they simply do not 
create enough of an incentive for candidates to participate.347  A public 
funding regime with no participants does nothing to fight corruption, no 
matter how constitutionally unassailable it may be. 
Alternatively, if states wish to preserve the essential triggering element, 
they can adopt the suggestion of the District Court of Arizona and tie 
trigger funds only to contributions, not expenditures.348  Unlike other 
mechanisms, such a revised provision would preserve the efficiency of the 
original by only allocating money when needed.  However, like other 
mechanisms, a revised trigger funds provision that only matches 
contributions would be blind to the spending that candidates fear the most:  
spending by wealthy opponents and independent groups.349  It seems likely 
that enrollment in public financing programs would fall as a result.  
Nevertheless, for states looking to maintain the basic functionality of their 
public finance regimes, the weakened trigger funds mechanism suggested 
by the District Court may present the best option. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s Davis decision made clear that the First 
Amendment must first protect speakers from government regulation instead 
of maximizing the aggregate amount of speech.  Despite this principle, 
trigger funds provisions of public finance regimes facilitate needed 
participation in the public system while preserving that system’s solvency.  
In doing so, they play a crucial role in preventing quid pro quo corruption, 
and the Supreme Court should affirm their constitutionality. 
 
 
 346. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
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